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Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
1. INTRODUCTION
Around the middle of the 20th century, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks
published an influential "tentative edition" of teaching materials, which declared: "The
hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted,
and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation."'
Early in the twenty-first century, it is fashionable to accept those words as gospel.
At least they are widely quoted and largely unchallenged.2 Justice Scalia apparently
agrees with them.3 Academic commentators sometimes expressly concur.4 Moreover,
the continuing cascade of statutory interpretation theories over the past twenty years
5
suggests that no one has yet discerned any coherent theory or theories underlying statu-
tory interpretation cases. 6 The Hart-Sacks dictum continues to support a notion that the
American judiciary has ad-libbed for generations on a very important area of judicial
I. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1201 (tentative ed. 1958), reprinted
in HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).
2. Among the articles more or less uncritically reciting the Hart and Sacks passage quoted in the text
above, are: Rev. Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for Meaning
in Public Texts, 68 Miss. L.J. 225, 226 n.5 (1998); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 65 n. 188 (2002); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule
of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV 227, 302 n.266 (2002); Leigh M. Chiles, Case Note, Summers v.
Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia: A "Disparate" Application of EMTALA's Terms, 50 ARK. L. REV. 559,
583 (1997); Maura A. Flood, "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One "-A Matter of Interpretation, 63 MONT. L.
REV. 39, 65 (2002); Carlos E. Gonzales, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 588
(1996); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into 'Specu-
lative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 765 n. 153 (1984); Theodore W. Jones, Textualism and Legal Process
Theory: Alternative Approaches to Statutory Interpretation, 26 J. LEGIS. 45, 45 n. I (2000); Clark Kelso &
Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 81, 81 (2000);
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002)
(contending apparently that Congress should statutorily dictate a set of rules for interpretation); M.B.W. Sin-
clair, Review Essay, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication? 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1329, 1346 (1997)
(reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE , DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)) [hereinafter Sinclair,
Legislative Intent]; M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 314 (1997) [hereinafter
Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning]; Leonard 0. Townsend, Note, Hey You, Get Off[ofl My Cloud: An Analysis of
Citizen Suit Preclusions Under the Clean Water Act, I I FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 75, 119 (1999).
3. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 14 (1997).
4. "[Sltatutory interpretation remains as complex, convoluted, and in need of clarification today as when
Professors Hart and Sacks wrote in the fifties, if not more so." Gonzales, supra note 2, at 588. See also Kelso
& Kelso, supra note 2, at 81 ("It is just so."); Flood, supra note 2, at 65 ("[l]n the year 2002, there remains no
better way to describe the current state of affairs with regard to statutory interpretation than to borrow the very
same words used by Hart and Sacks forty-four years ago.").
5. For an article containing an invaluable bibliography of articles published between 1988-1997, see
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings:
An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. Rev. 9 (2000) (part of an important symposium on statutory interpretation).
See also, Araujo, supra note 2, at 226-27 ("[Wle have become awash in theories and meta-theories .
6. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 81.
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responsibility, and it continues to reinforce the conventional wisdom that statutory inter-
pretation is a mess.
7
At the risk of being subversive, however, this article will maintain (and try to do so
in ordinary English) that the conventional wisdom is flawed. Considering the complexi-
ties involved in applying statutes to live cases, 8 overall courts have done fairly well.
They may not have a "theory" in the sense of a simplistic template that can be mechani-
cally applied to reach "determinate results." 9 However, they do have a familiar frame-
work for analysis and a stable set of concepts and tools that they use in explaining their
statutory interpretation decisions. 10 These concepts and tools are pervasive, and they are
remarkably durable. Courts have been using them for more than 200 years. The "hard
7. "At first glance, there appears to be nothing but a hodge-podge of ways to discover or resolve ambigu-
ity in order to find legislative 'intent."' Id. at 8 I. For examples of other remarks, see Roger Colinvaux, Note,
What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133,
1154 (1997) ("[Flor deciding cases, the methods of statutory interpretation are a mess."); Jones, supra note 2,
at 45 ("Although it has repeatedly been called upon to interpret federal statutes, the Supreme Court of the
United States has not done so in a consistent fashion."); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in
the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1543 (1994) (referring to "the incoherence of contem-
porary statutory interpretation").
8. See infra Part III.
9. "Determinate results" seems to be a fashionable academic phrase used to connote predictability, for
lack of a better word. A search on February I, 2003, of the law review data base for "determinate results"
yielded 182 results, so the phrase certainly is used rather frequently. However, at least one writer, other than
the writer of the present article, has expressed some uncertainty about the meaning of "determinate" when
used in legal literature: "In any event, I do not understand what a more determinate standard of review means.
Do Shapiro and Levy believe that any five judges approaching the same problem will come out with the same
'determinate' result?" Marshall J. Breger, Indeterminacy and Craft in Judicial Review of Administrative Law:
A Comment on Shapiro and Levy, 45 CATH. U.L. REV. 109, 114 (1995).
When we look at the standard definitions of "determinate" we find: "having defined limits," "not
uncertain," "definite," "fixed by rule or by some definite and constant cause," "invariable," "definitely set-
tled," "determined by coming to a conclusion ...." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
616 (1986). If a theory of statutory interpretation must have "determinate results," in the sense of predictable
or fixed results, then any theory which truly yielded "determinate results" would render judges obsolete. We
could just apply the theory and let the "determinate results" emerge.
Nevertheless, "determinate results" seems to be a favorite phrase of some writers who criticize other
theories of statutory interpretation because they do not yield "determinate results." See, e.g. William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325
(1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning]. "A grand theory loses much of its raison d'etre,
we argue, if it cannot reliably assure determinate results." See id. (emphasis added); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION] (criticizing various theories of statutory interpretation [which compete with his
own] as not yielding determinate results, and stating, "None of the methodologies yields determinate results.
Consequently, none fully constrains statutory interpreters .... ). In response to such statements, Professor
Sinclair has asserted that it requires too much of statutory interpretation theories, and is downright fallacious,
to demand "determinate results" in disputable cases. See Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 1345-58.
10. Although there arguably is a difference between "statutory interpretation" and "statutory construc-
tion," the term "statutory interpretation" generally will be used throughout this article to denote the process of
applying statutory language to live cases. In this respect, I gladly follow the lead of two eminent authorities:
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 19 (1975) (referring to the distinc-
tion between "interpretation" and "construction" as being "now generally disregarded"); and Frederick J.
deSloovere, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. R. 411 (1932) (saying that "For
all practical purposes, they may be regarded as synonymous terms") (footnote and citation omitted). For a
discussion of the arguable differences, see id. at 407-1I.
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truth of the matter" may well be something different from the conventional wisdom of
Hart & Sacks.
Part II.A of this article briefly discusses the following: (1) the prevalent, pervasive
framework for analysis that American courts commonly use in statutory interpretation
cases; (2) the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation that are used
within this framework; and (3) the durability (for more than 200 years) of these concepts
and tools. Then, in somewhat of a detour, Part II.B reviews a few academic theories of
statutory interpretation that are particularly relevant to this article.
Part III examines, in light of information from cognitive psychology (and common
sense), a few of the complexities involved in reading and applying statutory language.
Statutory interpretation requires some of the most complex mental processing that ordi-
nary human beings are called upon to perform. Moreover, much of that mental process-
ing is unconscious. Research from cognitive psychology suggests that the traditional
concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are reflections, tempered by collective
judicial experience, of how our minds work when confronted with the complexities (and
uncertainties) of processing written statutory words and explaining the application of
those abstract written words to real cases. The concepts and tools of statutory interpreta-
tion are not the mechanical product of some kind of positivistic, intellectual assembly
line. Statutory interpretation is a process of the mind, not the application of a yardstick.
Part IV, using a term from modem cognitive psychology and related disciplines,
contends that the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are "heuris-
tics,"" or at least heuristic in nature.' 2 Most definitely, they are not "rules," in the sense
of common law substantive rules having the force of law. Rather, they are deeply rooted
ways of explaining how we cope with the complexities of inferring meaning from writ-
ten words, and it is very dangerous to drift (or be pushed) toward a formalism that treats
them as substantive "rules."'
' 3
Part V emphasizes the benefits of realizing that traditional concepts and tools of
statutory interpretation are heuristics, or heuristic in nature. Once we understand the
heuristic nature of these concepts and tools, we have a powerful explanatory framework
for what American courts have been doing for more than 200 years. Furthermore, once
we understand the heuristic nature of these concepts and tools, a lot of confusion about
"plain meaning," "textualism," "legislative intent," and other aspects of statutory inter-
pretation can be reduced. Moreover, once we understand the heuristic nature of statutory
interpretation, it may be more difficult to criticize courts for the lack of an academically
satisfying "theory." It may no longer be so easy to imply that the messiness of statutory
interpretation cases is entirely the fault of an inept, or a "willful, law-bending,"' 4 judici-
1I. For purpose of this article, the term "heuristics" is used as rough rules of thumb, mental short-cuts, or
simplifying devices of the mind for coping with complexity and the need to make decisions under conditions
of uncertainty.
12. See infra Part IV.A-B.
13. See infra Parts V.B.6, V.B.8, VI.
14. SCALIA, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing "canons" of statutory interpretation and contending, with
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ary. With a better understanding of the nature of the concepts and tools of statutory in-
terpretation, we can begin to study more effectively the enterprise of statutory interpreta-
tion.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE THEORISTS AND THE JUDICIARY
A. What the Courts Say, and Have Said
I. Inevitable Micro-Level Inconsistencies and Broader Consistencies
At the micro-level of individual cases, we cannot expect, much less demand, consis-
tency of each case with every other case. Courts decide a staggering number of cases
involving statutes. Statutes involve every conceivable subject. The sheer number of
written opinions and the diversity of subjects guarantee that there will be some degree of
inconsistency (both real and arguable) among those opinions.
However, when we broaden our perspective-looking at the concepts and tools that
courts use in explaining their decisions-the picture is different.' 5 There is a surprising
degree of overall consistency in the concepts, tools, and techniques that courts use in
explaining their decisions. Variations in the details are still abundant, but these varia-
tions are variations on a finite range of themes. Basically, there is a two-step frame-
work. '
6
a. First Step (and Two Variants of the First Step): Look at the Text
Courts almost universally begin their explanation of reasons for their decisions in
statutory interpretation cases with the statutory text at issue.' 7 There are two main judi-
literal but misleading accuracy, that canons do not include "every vapid statement that has ever been made by
a willful, law-bending judge").
15. At least one academic theorist has admitted that, at a high level of abstraction, statutory interpretation
is very stable, a point which is being made in the text of the present article. However, he argues that a high
level of abstraction "is too airy to be interesting" [to academics, one supposes] and that, at a detailed level,
statutory interpretation "fluctuates rather dramatically over short periods." Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of
Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 149 (2001) [hereinafter Vermeule, Cycles of Statutory Inter-
pretation]. The present article has no real quarrel with contentions that, when examined at a micro-level of
"detail," statutory interpretation, like almost any phenomenon, will seem to be unstable---even fluctuating
wildly. In fact, like many subjects, statutory interpretation when examined at a micro-level will seem more
incoherent than it really is. In this regard, statutory interpretation can be compared to a newspaper photograph.
When observed in extreme detail, through a magnifying lens, the photograph is nothing but a blur, and we fail
to see the picture. It is all too easy for academics to use the technique of "zooming in" to point out the blurred
details and "incoherence" of a particular judicial subject, and then "zooming out" to justify their own theories,
or to criticize other approaches as "too airy to be interesting."
16. This "two-step" approach actually is a matter of two basic heuristics of statutory interpretation. See
infra Part IV.B.2-4.
17. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) ("The starting point for
our interpretation of a statute is always its language."). For additional examples of cases using exactly the
same words, see Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989) and Yates Dev.,
Inc. v. Old Kings Interchange, Inc., 256 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11 th Cir. 2001). "It is a truism that statutory inter-
[Vol. 30:1l
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
cial variants of this textual foundation. First, according to one highly questionable but
currently fashionable variant of the judicial descriptions, 8 the process may end (suppos-
edly) at that point. If the relevant statutory text is deemed to be clear and unambiguous
(a.k.a. has a "plain meaning"), then the court simply "applies" that statutory text 9-
unless there is some ill-defined exception, such as "absurd results, ' 20 or "clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent to the contrary.'
This variant has numerous flaws.22 However, we are concerned at this juncture only
with describing the general judicial framework as the courts themselves describe it. The
pretation begins with the plain meaning of the statute's language." Seal I v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2001).
This first step has a long pedigree. According to one writer, "Grotius and Pufendorf down through
Blackstone and Marshall all agree that interpreters must first consult the text, and enforce the 'plain meaning'
(i.e., the 'natural sense' or 'ordinary meaning' in the sense of consensual and normative meaning) if this is
available." Robert Lowry Clinton, Classical Legal Naturalism and the Politics of John Marshall's Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 935, 949 (2000). Two early cases that used "plain meaning" in
a statutory context are: Baileu & Bogert v. Ogden & Ogden, 3 Johns. 399, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808) ("[Olur
leaning should be towards the plain meaning of the statute. The circumstances which are to be tantamount to
an actual delivery should be very strong and unequivocal, so as to take away all doubt as to the intent and
understanding of the parties."); and Parker & Gantz v. Ogden, 2 N.J.L. 136, 140 (N.J. 1806) ("The plain mean-
ing and intention of the statute is, that no man shall be deprived of his liberty in a civil suit, until affidavit be
made of the cause of action, and that affidavit filed.").
18. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; supra Parts II.B.2, V.B.2-4.
19. See. e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) ("Our first step in interpreting a statute
is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particu-
lar dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent.") (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); Snukal v.
Flightways Mfg., Inc., 3 P.3d 286, 304 (Cal. 2000) ("Ordinarily, if the statutory language is clear and unambi-
guous, there is no need for judicial construction."); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ("[W]hen
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its
plain and obvious meaning.") (citation omitted).
20. For a general discussion of the "absurd results" concept, see Veronica Dougherty, Absurdity and the
Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 127
(1994). "The term absurd represents a collection of values, best understood when grouped under the headings
of reasonableness, rationality, and common sense." Id. at 133.
21. "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is
unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). For another recent "exception," see Robinson,
519 U.S. at 340 ("Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.") (emphasis added).
22. For purposes of the present article, a few flaws of "plain meaning" are worth noting here. To begin
with, the "plain meaning" "rule" does not explain how to discern whether or not the relevant language has a
"plain meaning," which is a serious defect in the shibboleth. One writer has expressed it this way: "The prob-
lem is that the meaning of plain meaning is itself not plain. As the Supreme Court has observed, "'There is no
errorless test for identifying or recognizing plain or unambiguous language."' George H. Taylor, Structural
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 356-57 (1995) (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580) (footnotes omitted).
This variant also fails to acknowledge that the actual process of attributing "meaning" to statutory
words involves complex, and often unconscious, mental processing. As one authority on statutory interpreta-
tion has noted, "The interpretive process is almost certainly, as Judge Posner suggests, one of moving back
and forth between words and other indicia of meaning without preconceived notions about whether the words
are clear." William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 543,
596 (1988) (citing Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHt. L. REV. 800 (1983)).
20031
Journal of Legislation
problems with this particular variant of "plain meaning" will be addressed later in this
article.23
• The second main variant rejects any notion that statutory meaning must be attrib-
uted on the basis of naked text alone. This variant, which seems to intuit the human
fallibility of relying on our own preconceptions about "meaning, '24 is most clearly re-
flected in a position to which the United States Supreme Court expressly adhered for at
least forty years: "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, how-
ever clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."' 25 A number of state
26courts follow or echo this position, although some U.S. Supreme Court Justices today
seem to ignore it deliberately. 7
Moreover, this variant is misleading. It implies a process in which a court reaches a conclusion about
"meaning" and then stops its analysis. A judicial opinion, however, does not necessarily reflect the actual
process by which a court arrived at a "meaning." The judicial opinion is "a reasoned justification of the deci-
sion prepared after the decision is made. The principal purpose of the opinion is to make the decision appear
consistent with the facts and the relevant statutory and judicial authority." Robert J. Martineau, Craft and
Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 27 (1993).
23. As implied later in this article, the heuristic nature of statutory interpretation and the unconscious
nature of mental processing of language help explain the tendency of courts to cling to the shibboleth that
statutory interpretation should cease, "if the meaning is clear and unambiguous." See infra Parts Il.A, V.B.2-
4.
24. See infra Part III.F-G.
25. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (footnotes and citations omitted).
Actually, this variant had been recognized for more than 40 years. Prior to the American Trucking case, Justice
Holmes had written for the Court, "It is said that when the meaning of language is plain, we do not resort to
evidence to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude con-
sideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48
(1928). For a good discussion, see Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975).
Some contemporary academics refer to this interpretive position as "soft" plain meaning. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626-30 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Tex-
tualism] (describing the Court's traditional approach as the "soft plain meaning" rule, under which literal text
could be trumped by strong indications of a different meaning, even indications found in legislative history).
Other writers have also used this terminology, albeit in a context limited to the consideration of legislative
history. "[Ilit was always possible that statutory language, no matter how plain, could be interpreted differently
if its apparently plain meaning was contradicted by legislative history. This 'soft plain-meaning rule' followed
from the Court's intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation." Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Con-
textualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (1998).
26. See, e.g., State v. Golino, 518 A.2d 57, 60 (Conn.1986); Four Star Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hawaiian Elec.
Indus., Inc., 974 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Haw. 1997) (pointing out that rigidly adhering to literal text could render it
impossible to determine, among other things, whether there is an absurd result); Wegener v. Comm'r of Reve-
nue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1993); Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 102 (N.Y. 2000). Many
state and federal court opinions use the same basic language. For example, a search of all federal and state
cases on March 7, 2003, for pertinent language from the Supreme Court opinion disclosed 213 cases. More
opinions probably use the same concept but not the same words.
One of the most interesting developments and variations at the state court level is found in Alaska,
which has "rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule in matters of statutory interpretation,
and .. .adopted a sliding scale approach instead." State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208-09 n.4 (Alaska 1982)
(citing State Dep't of Nat. Resources v. City of Haines, 627 P.2d 1047, 1049 n.6 (Alaska 1981)).
27. The American Trucking line of cases seems to have been simply ignored by members of the Supreme
Court today. It appears that the last time a Supreme Court majority opinion cited American Trucking for the
[Vol. 30:1
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The differences between these two main variants 28 are not particularly important.
The first variant sounds more absolute, literally barring any further consideration of
"meaning" if the meaning seems to be "plain." Even on its own terms, however, the first
variant recognizes blurry, easily manipulable exceptions, such as "absurd results" and
the overriding force of legislative "intent" or "purpose." 29 The second variant rejects an
absolutely preclusive concept of "plain meaning" and therefore does not need any ex-
pressed exceptions. The crucial similarity is that both put initial emphasis on statutory
text, suggesting a fundamental consistency among the courts.
b. Second Step: If It is Not Clear and Unambiguous
If the statutory text is not deemed to be clear and unambiguous, or is deemed to lack
"plain meaning," then a court must go further. Many courts have described this aspect of
statutory interpretation in terms of discerning or finding the "legislative intention" or
"intent." 30 The terminology of "intent[ion]" has a venerable ancestry. It was used in the
era of Chief Justice John Marshall,3' and the basic concept is found in Blackstone.32
Unfortunately, the subjective connotations of the words "intent" and "intention" have
proposition that there is no "rule" regarding adherence to the "plain meaning" of statutory language was in
1989. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989).
28. There are, of course, other variants on the theme of "text" in statutory interpretation. An interesting
modem case recognizes that text and extra-textual considerations cannot be separated all that neatly:
In interpreting and determining legislative intent, we must look to the plain language of the en-
actment, while keeping in mind its overall purpose and aim. Only when both of these tasks are
done concurrently do we obtain an accurate interpretation of the statute .... Moreover, the stat-
ute should be examined in its entirety and not just as isolated, independent sections.
Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, 760 A.2d 663, 675 (Md. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omit-
ted). Likewise, Justice Scalia has told us that "Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor." United Sav-
ings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
Sometimes a court totally conflates "plain meaning" with the "legislative intention" aspect of statutory
interpretation:
Our analysis commences with the premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to as-
certain and effectuate legislative intent. Our first step [in determining legislative intent] is to
scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. In
analyzing statutory language, we seek to give meaning to every word and phrase in the statute to
accomplish a result consistent with the legislative purpose ....
Snukal v. Flightways Mfg., Inc., 3 P.3d 286, 304 (Cal. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). But even
in such cases, the central role of statutory language is a fundamental constant.
29. See supra Parts II.A. I .b, II.B.2, V.B.2-4.
30. See, e.g., Tabb v. State, 297 S.E. 2d 227, 230 (Ga. 1982) ("But where, as here, the words of the statute
are inherently ambiguous, our task is to 'look diligently for the intent of the General Assembly."') (citations
omitted).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Potts, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 284, 287 (1809) ("T]he copper in question cannot
be deemed manufactured copper within the intention of the legislature."); Scott v. Lloyd, 34 U.S. 418, 446
(1835) ("[lt was not the intention of the legislature to interfere with individuals in their ordinary transactions
of buying and selling .... ).
32. At least Professor Manning tells us that, "[Tlhe practice of determining--or ascribing-legislative
intent is so traditional that it is recorded matter-of-factly in Blackstone's Commentaries." John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine. 97 COLuM. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1997). See also, SCALIA, supra
note 3, at 16 (conceding that "intent of the legislature... goes at least as far back as Blackstone").
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created considerable confusion and academic consternation. 33 A conglomerate legisla-
tive entity does not have an "intention" in the same sense that an individual has a subjec-
tive intention. 34 In order to avoid semantic confusion, this article will remain purely
descriptive. Simply put, there are two basic variants in the judicial description of the
second step of the conventional and traditional judicial framework. One variant uses the
words, "intent" or "intentions." For example,
In determining legislative intent, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statute .... However, if a statute is ambiguous because it is 'reasonably suscepti-
ble to more than one meaning,' we may consider among other factors the object the
legislature sought to obtain by its enactment, the circumstances under which it was
adopted, the legislative history of the statute, and the legislative declaration or pur-
35pose.
The other variant may, with or without using the word "intent(ion)," say something
on the order of, "Because some ambiguity exists, the court may examine a variety of
factors including the language used, the context, the subject matter, the effects and con-
sequences, and the spirit and purpose of the law."
36
The key to understanding "legislative intent[ion]" is understanding that these vai-
ants have the underlined words in each quoted passage-"variety of factors" and "other
factors" in common. These "factors" are a wide assortment of concepts and tools vari-
ously labeled maxims, precepts, principles, canons, etc.37 They are shorthand for what
the courts say they will consider if they admit that the statutory language at issue is not
plain, clear, or unambiguous. They are wild cards, to borrow a poker metaphor.
33. See infra Part II.B.2.
34. See infra Parts II.B.2, V.B.4.
35. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 268 (Colo. 1999) (emphasis added)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697 P.2d 684, 687 (Ariz. 1985)
("In determining the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute, this Court will look to the policy behind the
statute and the evil which it was designed to remedy. Additionally, we will look to the words, context, subject
matter, and effects and consequences of the statute.") (citations omitted).
36. State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681, 681 (Ariz. 1992) (emphasis added).
37. For purposes of this article, I label these factors "concepts and tools."
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Unfortunately, there are a significant number of such wild cards. 38 The profusion of
"other factors" contributes too much of the messiness in statutory interpretation. In fact,
on the surface, these numerous "other factors" and wild cards give the impression of
judicial incoherence. However, there actually are a finite number of fairly standardized
concepts and tools. Courts are not making them up as they go along. 39 These concepts
and tools are stable enough for a census to be taken, and various writers catalogue
them.4 0 Referring to them loosely as "canons," one leading theorist has remarked that
38. For more examples, in addition to those in the text accompanying supra notes 35-37, see the follow-
ing: Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992) ("'We must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law."') (citation omitted) (utilizing
the "whole statute" concept); Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assocs., 741 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000) ("There is a presumption that every word in the statute is designed to have legal effect, and every
part of the statute must be regarded where practicable so as to give effect to every part of it.") (discussing a
concept related to the "whole statute," a presumption against surplusage, i.e., a presumption that every word in
a statute is to be given effect.). For variations on this concept, see Dept. of Gen. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 147 Cal.
Rptr. 422, 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (interpretation of certain provisions of State Contract Act); Murphy Ex-
ploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("when construing a stat-
ute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used"). For an interesting discussion of a
case in which different justices and ajudge used this presumption to justify different interpretations, see Brad-
ford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties,
Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 594-98 (1997-98) (pointing out
differing opinions of Judge Sentelle, Justice Stevens, and Justice Scalia).
For an example of the presumption against implied repeals so a later statute will not casually be read
as impliedly repealing part of an earlier statute, see Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1034 (4th Cir.
1997) ("Because of the strong presumption against implied repeal, we will not find an implied repeal unless
one of these conditions [irreconcilable conflict of the two provisions or the later statute covering the entire
subject of earlier provisions] is satisfied.").
For an example of the factor, in pari materia-a fancy law-Latin phrase for the proposition that a
court may consider other statutes of the same general kind or type when attributing meaning to a statutory
provision, see Ruth Fisher Elem. Sch. Dist. v. Buckeye Union High Sch. Dist. 41 P.3d 645, 648 (Ariz. App.
2002) ("If the statutes relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose-that is, statutes which are
in pari materia-they should be read in connection with, or should be construed together with other related
statutes, as though they constituted one law.").
39. If the situation were as incoherent and messy as some folks imply, there would be no way in which
reference works such as West's Key Digest and American Jurisprudence 2d could have intelligible sections on
statutory construction. See, e.g., WEST'S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, Statutes, key numbers 174-278
(1994); 73 AM. JUR. 2D., Statutes §§ 60-261 (2001).
It should be noted here that, although most courts use the traditional concepts and tools of statutory
interpretation, there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of some latter-day theorists and even jurists to use
new labels for these old concepts. Justice Scalia, for example, refers to statutory interpretation as being "holis-
tic" in nature, but his elucidation of "holistic" is not much more than a description of the "whole statute"
concept-reading all parts of a statute when attributing meaning to a particular provisions. United Savings
Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) ("Statutory construction ... is
a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of
the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law.") (citations omitted).
"Clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme" restates the core of the traditional "whole statute"
concept, stated in different language and using the label "holistic." See supra note 38 (parts thereof discussing
"whole statute"). Nor does it appear that the quoted passage even pays lip service to the similarity between
"holistic" and the old "whole statute" concept. Justice Scalia, of course, is not the only offender in this regard.
However, he is one of the most prominent, and he asserts some expertise on statutory interpretation. See
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 1-47.
40. One important example is found in ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9,
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they can be "look[ed] at... as an interpretive regime that has been created by our courts
over the centuries and that can be set forth systematically.",41 The various factors men-
tioned by the courts therefore are not in hopeless disarray. At least, they are orderly
enough for academics and reference works to identify and list them.
c. Interim Conclusion
Our courts do not seem to be acting totally without any kind of methodology or
framework for statutory interpretation, whether we want to call it a "theory" or not. If
they are ad-libbing, they are ad-libbing in the sense of improvising, like Johann Sebas-
tian Bach 42 or a jazz musician. Not every judge or Justice is a Bach or a jazz musician,
of course, and to some people, jazz sounds incoherent. The problem for academics lies
in discerning the difference between valid judicial improvisation and judicial fumbling
or rationalization.
2. Durability
Even more significant than the existence of pervasive, fairly consistent concepts and
tools of statutory interpretation is the longevity of those concepts and tools. Many of
these judicially described concepts and tools have changed very little since the time of
William Blackstone. In his treatise, Commentaries, William Blackstone's description of
statutory interpretation was brief and off-handed, 43 but his observations sound remarka-
bly familiar today. The following passages from Blackstone will depart from bluebook
conventions by interspersing in the quoted text some footnotes citing to modem cases
using the same or similar language:
I. Interpretation by the Usual Meaning of Words. - The fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator44 is by exploring his intentions at the
at 323-33. A similar list is found in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term: Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-107 (1994). "The Appendix divides the
canons into three conventional categories: the textual canons setting forth conventions of grammar and syntax,
linguistic inferences, and textual integrity; extrinsic source canons, which direct the interpreter to authoritative
sources of meaning; and substantive policy canons which embody public policies drawn from the Constitution,
federal statutes, or the common law." Id. at 97. Another important article with an appendix of statutory inter-
pretation concepts and tools is Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 506-08 (1989).
41. William Eskridge, Jr., Remarks at Northwestern University/Washington University Law School and
Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 800, 872 (1995) (emphasis added).
42. DOUGLAs HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 3-4 (1988) (citing
and quoting from H.T. DAVID & A. MENDEL, THE BACH READER 305-06) (describing Johann Sebastian
Bach's musical improvisation).
43. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59-62, 87-92 (1765).
44. "Will of the legislator," coupled with "intentions," certainly resembles "legislative intention" in mod-
ern terms. Moreover, while it is rare in modern times, the quaint and outmoded "will of the legislator" was
repeated as late as Koster v. Turchi, 173 F.2d 605, 607 (3d Cir. 1949) ("As was said in United States v.
Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103 [1897], 'The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain
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time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs
are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or
the spirit and reason of the law.45 Let us take a short view of them all.
Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification
46
.... [T]erms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of
the learned in each art, trade, and science....
2. According to context. If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context47 .... Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a
law with other laws, that are made by the same legislator, that have some affinity with
the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point .... 48
5. According to the reason of the law. But, lastly, the most universal and effectual
way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by con-
the will of the legislator."').
45. For a recent example of a case using some of this verbal formula, see Aitken v. Indus. Comm'n of
Arizona, 904 P.2d 456, 461 (Ariz. 1995) ("We now hold that a carrier may assert a lien on a third party recov-
ery only to the extent that the compensation benefits paid exceed the employer's proportionate share of the
total damages fixed by verdict in the action. In doing so, we are particularly mindful of the context, subject
matter, and effects and consequences of the statute.") (emphasis added).
There has, of course, been some reshuffling of the order and precise words in the 20th century, but the
basic components of Blackstone are still very much with us. See, e..g., Spencer v. West Alabama Prop., Inc.,
564 So.2d 425, 427 (Ala. 1990) (stating that statutes often drafted so poorly that it is necessary to put more
reliance on "context, the subject-matter, the consequences and effects, and the reason and spirit of the law, in
endeavoring to arrive at the will of the law giver.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Korzep, 799 P.2d 831, 833 (Ariz. 1990) ("To determine legislative intent, we consider the statute's context, the
language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the statute's effects and consequences, and the
statute's spirit and purpose .... Additionally, we consider the policy behind the statute and the evil it was
designed to remedy.... We give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature
clearly intended a different meaning .. ") (citations omitted); Livingood v. Negrete, 547 N.W.2d 196, 197
(Iowa 1996) ("In seeking legislative intent, the subject matter, effect, reason for the statute and consequences
of proposed interpretations must all be considered.") (citations omitted); Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 744
A.2d 422, 426 (2000) ( "In construing a statute, our objective is to implement the intent of the Legislature. ...
We look to the 'whole of the statute and every part of it, its subject matter, the effect and consequences, and
the reason and spirit of the law.' ... Of course if the statute is unambiguous and the words have a plain mean-
ing, we apply that meaning.") (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Valentino v. Franchise Tax Bd., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 308 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]e
look first to the words of the statute itself, endeavoring to accord them their usual and ordinary meaning. We
construe the language in the context of the statutory framework as a whole, always mindful of the policies and
purposes underlying the enactment and endeavoring to read the language so as to conform to its spirit.") (cita-
tions omitted).
47. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgm't Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992) ("We must not be guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law.") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Our analysis is
governed by fundamental principles of statutory construction. A basic guide to the meaning of statutory lan-
guage is the context of the statute as a whole."). Similarly, "statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give
each word some operative effect." Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997).
48. This tool or concept is also known in its latinate form, in pari materia.
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sidering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause, which moved the legislator to enact
it.49
There are, of course, other familiar statutory interpretation tenets to be found in Black-
stone's works.5 °
The long and short of the matter is that judicial descriptions of many statutory in-
terpretation concepts and tools have not changed very much since the late 18th Century.
Although the words are not always identical to Blackstone's, the basic semantic content
has been changed very little, or not at all.5'
This persistence seems particularly odd when we consider that, quantitatively, far
fewer statutes existed 200 years ago, and qualitatively, many statutes today are of a very
different order than those of the early 19th century.52 Given such differences, we might
be inclined to predict that there would have been significant changes in the way courts
describe the process of attributing meaning to statutory language. However, the tools
49. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 60-62 (partial emphasis added). The "cause which moved the legisla-
tor to enact" is semantically equivalent to phrases such as purpose or motive when used in connection with
statutory interpretation cases. For example, "We may also look to the reason and necessity for the statute and
the purpose sought to be obtained by enacting the statute." Pace v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 578 So.2d
281, 283 (Ala. 1991); Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 780 A.2d 1, 41 (2001) ("There-
fore, on the basis of the plain language of § 8-30g (c) and its legislative history, the circumstances surrounding
its enactment, and the purpose for which it was designed, we conclude that the legislature intended that the
commission have the burden of proving that the public interest cannot be protected by reasonable changes to
the proposed development.").
50. "Construction of Remedial Statutes.-There are three points to be considered in the construction of all
remedial statutes: the old law, the mischief, and the remedy .... And it is the business of the judges so to
construe the act, as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy .... BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 87.
Even today, one can find recent cases which recite the quaint "mischief to be remedied" formula. See, e.g.,
Carlon Co. v. Bd. of Review, 572 N.W.2d 146, 154 (Iowa 1997) ("A further rule of statutory construction
requires us to look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs to be remedied."). See also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 88 ("Construction of Penal Statutes.-Penal statutes must be construed
strictly .. "); Id. ("Construction by Context-One part of a statute must be so construed by another that the
whole may (if possible) stand .... "). Id. at 89.
5 1. Blackstone is not the only evidence for the durability of these and other concepts and tools of statutory
construction. The Arguments of Counsel preceding an early reported New Jersey case contain a veritable gold
mine of early statutory construction maxims, most of which have changed very little in more than 200 years.
See Den, On the Demise of Hinchman v. Clark & Zilcar, I N.J.L. 391 (N.J. 1795). Among the concepts and
tools cited in these arguments of counsel, we find a familiar statement of the maxim against implied repeals.
"The law does not favor repeals by implication. If both acts be merely affirmative, and the substance such that
both may stand together, the latter does not repeal the former, but they shall both have a concurrent efficacy."
Id. at 404.
52. "[Nlineteenth-century legislative activity at both federal and state levels still lacked the broad pro-
grammatic and reformist themes of modern twentieth-century legislation. . . . The dominant view (at least
among most lawyers in the first half of the century) was that legislation primarily patched up the common
law." WILLIAM POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
61 (1999) [hereinafter POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT]. A writer in 1835 characterized state statutes as predomi-
nantly either to "define and affirm some principle of the common law" or "to carry into operation a newly
formed government, by organizing its departments, directing the election of its officers, and regulating those
innumerable details, which the exigencies of society present, in the early stages of an original political sys-
tem." FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 6 (1835).
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and concepts that courts say they use today have not undergone all that much change for
the past 200 years.53 This is a matter which should puzzle us considerably.
54
Is it some kind of weird coincidence that American courts for over two hundred
years have consistently referred to certain concepts and tools in cases involving the ap-
plication of statutes? Did it just happen? Why have so many of the key concepts en-
dured, with relatively little change, for over two hundred years, even though the number
and types of statutes have changed dramatically? The tools and concepts of statutory
interpretation are a constant, and a pretty remarkable constant, when you think about it.
When something is a constant in a system, it is worth studying.
As one writer has put it, these concepts and tools ("practices of statutory interpreta-
tion") have "shown robust durability for centuries .... ,,5' This consistency over time
may be very significant.56 If the words used over the past 200 years to describe judicial
methodologies of statutory interpretation do have some reasonably consistent content,
despite two centuries of revolutionary changes in social conditions, then it would seem
that courts are doing something that overall is fairly consistent, and that merits study.
3. Summation: Prevalence and Durability
Simply put, courts have developed a large and stable assortment of tools and con-
cepts in dealing with statutory interpretation. Many of these concepts and tools demon-
strably have been around for a long time. If we do not understand something of their
nature and how they are used, then we hardly can expect to understand what courts are
doing in statutory interpretation cases. A better understanding of those concepts and
tools is crucial to statutory interpretation theory.
53. Even a term such as "liberal construction," with all its modern overtones, has been around for a long
time. "The statute [Laws, Vol. 1., 5361 gives to executors an action of trespass, for taking and carrying away
the goods of their testator, in his lifetime. This statute was borrowed from 4 E. III., ch. 7, which had made a
similar provision; and by the equity and liberal construction of that statute it has been extended to almost every
injury done to the personal estate of the testator before his death." Snider & Van Vecten v. Croy, 2 Johns. 227,
228-29, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807). Moreover, the relationship of "liberal construction" to earlier doctrines has been
recognized. For an article that discusses the relationship between equitable construction and liberal consiruc-
tion, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 805-08 (1985).
54. Moreover, as we enter the 21st century, the three dominant theories or models of statutory interpreta-
tion retain most of the concepts and tools that existed 200 years ago. See infra Part lI.B. 1-4.
55. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, supra note 2, at 381-82. See also, Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra
note 2, at 2.
56. This consistency does not mean that the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are utterly static.
One writer explains that there are cycles and refinements in statutory interpretation, as in any other area of the
law. He states, "My basic strategy is to explore the possibility that interpretive doctrine displays a regular
tendency to oscillate, or cycle, over a defined range of positions on major doctrinal questions." Vermeule,
Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15, at 150. The very existence of cycles implies recurrence and
hence stability in the main concepts.
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B. Academic Theories
Meanwhile, back at the law schools, the period since 1980 has been a tremendously
exciting, productive, and frustrating era for discourse about statutory interpretation.57 If
anything, we have today a surplus of theories.58 It is becoming very difficult to keep up
with all of the "literature," and it is impossible to summarize adequately and do justice
to all extant theories in one article. If nothing else, it is impossible because new theories
and variations on theories keep coming out. 59 A whole new vocabulary has become
57. A couple of short pieces discussing the "revival" of theory in statutory interpretation are especially
readable. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theor, in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992) [hereinafter Frickey, The Big Sleep]; Philip P. Frickey, Es-
sa'y: Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84
MINN. L. REV. 199 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Revisiting the Revival].
58. For an article containing an invaluable bibliography of articles published between 1988-1997, see
Crespi, supra note 5. For some articles and books published since 1997, see infra note 59.
59. For just a sampling of articles and books published since 1997, see Bernard W. Bell, Legislative
History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 6 (1999) (advancing a "public justification" theory which "seeks to justify the use of committee reports
and floor statements in interpreting statutes because legislatures are under a duty to 'explain statutes as well as
enact them" and those documents are part of the 'public justification' of the statute"); William S. Blatt, Inter-
pretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutor, Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 630 (2001)
[hereinafter Blatt, Interpretive Communities] (suggesting that statutory interpretation should adopt the perspec-
tive of the "interpretive community" responsible for the statutory issue); William W. Buzbee, The One-
Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000) (criticizing legal fiction of "one
congress" as resulting in interpretive practices, such as examining other statutes, which give too much power
and discretion to the courts); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the
Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. REV. 577, 583 (2001) [hereinafter Cavanaugh, Aristotle] (arguing that the "methodol-
ogy Aristotle develops for considering the relationship of words and their definitions allows a determinate, yet
open-ended method for understanding language that corresponds well with our experience in reality, but is
supported by sophisticated logical and philosophical underpinnings .. .providing a method for principled
analysis ... as well as a method that allows for resolution of some hard and interesting cases"); Carol Chom-
sky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000) (examining the Church of the Holy Trinity case in detail and arguing in favor of
using legislative history materials in statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Formalism and Statu-
tor
, 
Interpretation: Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671
(1999) [hereinafter Eskridge, Fornalism] (discussing subjecting theories of statutory interpretation to empiri-
cal testing); Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1409, 1409-11 (2000) (discussing opinions and theories of two academics sitting on the same U.S. court
of appeals and concluding that theories have only a marginal effect on the outcome of the four cases studied);
Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 57 (reviewing developments and issues in statutory interpretation);
Scott Fruehwald, Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 973 (2000) (offering a statutory interpretation theory which merely uses
the same old traditional concepts and tools discussed in the text of the present article); Michael P. Healy,
Cominunis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM &
MARY L. REV. 539 (2001) (examining Supreme Court's interpretive methodology in context of communis
opinio canon); Jones, supra note 2 (discussing legal process versus textualist debate in context of a particular
case); Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2 (arguing that the actual methods of statutory interpretation are aligned
more with the judges' overall approach to decision making, rather than any theory of statutory interpretation);
Eric S. Lasky, Note, Perplexing Problems With Plain Meaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891 (1999) (discussing
plain meaning rule); Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Dar-
win, 20 PACE. L. REV. 409 (2000) (arguing, analogous to scientific complexity theories, that the interpretation
of a statute can change over time); POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 52 (major work reviewing history
of statutory interpretation and advancing a theory of "ordinary judging"); Rosenkranz, supra note 2 (suggest-
ing that many problems of statutory interpretation could be solved in federal courts if Congress were to enact
[Vol. 30:1
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
associated with statutory interpretation theory, along with the inevitable disagreement
and confusions about what each of the new terms denotes. To list a few: "originalism," 60
"intentionalism," 61 "modified intentionalism, ' '62 "imaginative reconstruction, 63 "pur-
more detailed rules to govern statutory interpretation); Jane S. Schachter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate
and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (actual interpretive practices in recent Supreme Court cases do not
follow conventional dichotomies but "[draw] from an array of judicially-created sources to delineate the range
of plausible textual meanings and then to select from among them."); Michael B. Slade, Note, Democracy in
the Details: A Plea for Substance Over Form in Statutory Interpretation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2000)
(arguing that courts should use legislative history materials); Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (1998) (discussing, among other things, the "presuppositions and effects of a com-
mon law system of legislating and judging"); Siegel, supra note 25 (advocating "contextualism," the interpre-
tation of statutes in light of background legal principles, e.g., interpretation of administrative law statutes in
light of background principles of administrative law); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empiri-
cally, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999) (discussing whether a valid defense of formalism in statutory interpreta-
tion must be empirical); Vermeule, Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 15 (offering a theory regard-
ing the various cycles in statutory interpretation); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Clo-
sure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 698 (1999) (discussing the application of empiricism to statutory interpreta-
tion); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000) (discussing problems of empirical
uncertainties in choosing interpretive doctrine and arguing that courts consequently should embrace a formalist
approach to statutory interpretation) [hereinafter Vermeule, Interpretive Choice]. One of the few systematic,
book-length, pre-1980 treatments of statutory interpretation written at a theoretical level is DICKERSON, supra
note 10.
60. There are various shades of "meaning" attached to the term "originalism" in statutory interpretation
theory. The daddy of modem usage of "originalism" in this context is, of course William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation], especially the discussion at 1480-88. There, "originalism" is characterized in the following
way: "Theoretically, these 'originalist' approaches to statutory interpretation assume that the legislature fixes
the meaning of a statute on the date the statute is enacted. The implicit claim is that a legislator interpreting the
statute at the time of enactment would render the same interpretation as a judge interpreting the same statute
fifty years later." Id. at 1480. See also, ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at
13-47. Some other articles which discuss "originalism" are: Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democ-
ratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68
TUL. L. REV. 803, 805 (1994) (announcing prematurely the death of originalism and stating, "originalist inter-
pretive models treat statutes as commands that emanate from the legislative branch"); Kelso & Kelso, supra
note 2, at 81; R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four
Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 37 (1997) ("Originalism resolves
interpretive questions by asking how the enacting Congress would have decided the question."); Karen M.
Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 233, 280 (1997) [hereinafter Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation] ("Originalists view statutes as
expressions of legislative policy choices. The judge's task is to discover and implement those policy choices as
the legislature's good faith agent.").
61. A key player with respect to describing, although certainly not defending, intentionalism is, again,
Professor Eskridge. See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at 14
("[I]ntentionalism . . . directs the interpreter to discover or replicate the legislature's original intent as the
answer to an interpretive question."). For other articles which discuss intentionalism, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Justice Breyer, Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist (Symposium), 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995)
(describing intentionalism as "interpreting a statute based on a judicial determination of the intent of the legis-
lature" and saying further, "Intentionalists attempt to draw interpretive inferences from the legislature's stated
goals and from a statute's legislative history."); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power:
The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (describing intentionalism
simply as the approach "which uses the intent of the enacting legislature as the basis for judicial decisionmak-
ing"). For articles by the strongest defender of intentionalism, see Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, supra note 2,
at 381-82. See also Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra note 2 (critical review of ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9). One writer has informed me that the terms "intentionalism" and
"textualism" were "first employed by Dean Brest in the context of constitutional interpretation." Daniel B.
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posivism, ' 64 "textualism, ' '65 "New Textualism, ' '66 "structural textualism, ' '67 "dynamic
statutory interpretation, ' 68 and "practical reasoning." 69 Nor do these exhaust the list.
70
For several reasons, this article will not even attempt any detailed summaries of the
current theories. First, of course, the sheer number of theories precludes such an ap-
proach. Second, these theories actually are impossible to summarize adequately, because
they are mental constructs composed largely of the theorists' own abstractions. To
Rodriguez, Review Essay, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, n.62 (1989).
62. Maltz, supra note 61, at I.
63. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 329-30 (1990) (a version of intentionalism
under which the judge imagines a reasonable interpretation on the basis of how the legislators would have
responded to the interpretive question at issue).
64. Although "purposivism" usually is included in the litany of dominant theories and distinguished from
"intentionalism," it sometimes is described in terms comparing it to intentionalism. "Purposivists use a more
objective approach in which the court first reviews the statute, its context, and history to discern the statute's
original purpose, then applies the statute in light of that underlying purpose." Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Inter-
pretation, supra note 60, at 283. "Purposivism," as a theory, generally is linked to Hart & Sacks. "Professors
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks developed purposivism in their legal process approach. The approach differs
from intentionalism in that the judge is not limited by the inquiry of whether the enacting legislature consid-
ered the issue before the court." Martineau, supra note 22, at 18. However, Hart & Sacks hardly invented the
larger concept of discerning or attributing the "purpose(s)" of a statute and interpreting the statute in ways
consistent with the discerned or attributed purpose(s). This use of purpose is a basic and long established
concept or tool of statutory construction, traceable to Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584)
(stating that courts should consider the "mischief' to be remedied by the statute). See, e.g., Martineau, supra
note 22, at 6. For some early cases where courts say that they consider the purpose or object of the statute, see
Rice v. Danville, L. & N. Turnpike Road Co., 37 Ky. 81, 83 (1838) (referring to the "manifest purpose of the
statute"); Blossom v. Goodwin, I Mass. (I Will.) 502, 506 (1805) ("The purpose of the statute will be com-
pletely answered by constructing the word 'action' to intend process .... ); Overseers of Poor v. Overseers of
Poor, 14 N.J.L. 321, 330 (1834) ("A contrary rule would defeat the object of the act, part of which is to secure
a proper super intendance of the youth, and to watch the inexperience of the apprentice.").
It would seem that "purposivism" might more accurately be regarded as a concept or tool of statutory
interpretation than a stand-alone "theory." Nevertheless, academic writers-perhaps mistakenly-tend to
identify "purposivism" as some separate kind of theory or model. See, e.g., Morell E. Mullins Sr., Coming to
Terms With Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9, 43 (2000) (referring to "the triumvirate of
textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism").
65. See infra Part II.B. I.
66. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 25, at 626-30. For Eskridge's summary of Justice Scalia's
version of New Textualism, see infra Part IH.B. 1.
67. Taylor, supra note 22, at 378-83 (arguing, among other things, for a limited use of legislative history
even in a textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
68. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at 9-1I (arguing for partial rejec-
tion of originalist, intentionalist, and textualist theories in favor of a theory which, under some circumstances,
allows interpretation of statutory provision in light of contemporary conditions). See also infra Part II.B.3.
69. "Practical reasoning" or a pragmatic theory has gained increasing support among academics in recent
years. The theory was christened in Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9. As discussed in
more detail below, practical reasoning retains all of the traditional concepts, tools, models, and anything else
relevant when interpreting statutes. See infra Part II.B.3. In this respect, of course, "practical reasoning" and
its cousins echo the voice of Chief Justice John Marshall, "[where] the mind labours to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived." United States v. Fisher, 2 U.S. (Cranch)
358, 386 (1805).
70. See, e.g., Blatt, Interpretive Communities, supra note 59 (advancing a theory that interpretation should
be in accordance with the "interpretive communities" involved under the particular statute); Cavanaugh, Aris-
totle, supra note 59, at 584 (advancing a theory based on works of Aristotle); POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT,
supra note 52 (suggesting a theory of "ordinary judging"); Rosenkranz, supra note 2 (suggesting that many
problems of statutory interpretation could be solved in federal courts if Congress were to enact more detailed
rules to govern statutory interpretation).
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summarize them is to distort them. As one particularly painstaking commentator stated,
"The interpretive debate has been complicated by conflicting ways of distinguishing and
naming the divergent interpretive methods.' Consequently, the precise content of some
theories is far from clear. One acerbic critic has even remarked that "[w]e are awash in
,,72fancy theories of statutory interpretation, some of which aren't really about interpre-
tation. "[These theories] are attempts to trade on the authority of statutes to enact the
interpreter's own preferences. . ."73 A less severe critic has remarked, "'Theories' of
statutory interpretation, such as intentionalism, purposivism, public choice analysis,
textualism, and practical reasoning, are simply rhetoric. 74 In any event, no single theory
has yet achieved consensus among academics or the courts.75
Finally, and most importantly, this article marches to its own drummer. The theories
mentioned above do not focus on the nature of the statutory interpretation concepts and
tools. 76 This article tries to examine some very basic questions about the nature of the
concepts and tools which courts use when explaining or describing how they resolve
statutory interpretation issues. Because dominant7 7 theories, or "models," 78 of textual-
71. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 346 n.95.
72. Larry Alexander, On Statutory Interpretation: Fancy Theories of Statutory Interpretation Aren't, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1081, 1081 (1995).
73. Id. at 1082.
74. Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1717, 1731 (1995).
75. See infra Part II.B.4. See also Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 81; POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT,
supra note 52, at 153 ("[Ais the twentieth century comes to a close ... a sense grows that no single ap-
proach-purposivism, Republicanism, or textualism-can explain statutory interpretation."). Several astute
commentators have reduced the number of theories to two. Professor Jonathan R. Siegel, for example, de-
scribes two main strands of competing theories: textualism and intentionalism. See Siegel, supra note 25, at
1025-26.
76. Put another way, few of the theorists or theories seem to have addressed the fundamental nature of
these concepts and tools. The most notable exception seems to be Sunstein, supra note 40. His article argues,
among other things, for a new set of background interpretive principles in the context of regulatory statutes
and the "regulatory state." "The traditional understandings of statutory construction are inadequate." Id. at
503. However, he only partially rejects, and does not seem to examine doctrinally, the traditional tools and
concepts. He goes on to say, "Under the approach suggested here, the statutory text is the foundation for
interpretation, but structure, purpose, intent, history, and 'reasonableness' all play legitimate roles." Id. Appar-
ently, he would retain many of the traditional concepts and tools, but deploy some other background or inter-
pretive principles. He also provides an interesting appendix of old and new precepts, or background norms. Id.
at 506-508. He then offers:
[U]nderstandings about how statutory interpretation will improve or impair the performance of
governmental institutions. Some such understandings are a firmly rooted and probably unavoid-
able part of interpretation. One might, for example, conclude that legislative history, produced
by private groups and never enacted, is entitled to little weight; or that appropriations statutes,
written hastily and without deliberation, should be narrowly construed. If one were simply de-
scribing statutory construction as it is currently practiced, one would find a number of back-
ground norms traceable to understandings of precisely this sort.
Id. at 466.
77. One of the most meticulous pieces of legal scholarship to date on statutory interpretation theory iden-
tified "three predominant methods of statutory analysis: originalism (comprising intentionalism and purposiv-
ism), textualism, and dynamism." Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 267. She also
provides an excellent summary of articles justifying her conclusion. See id. at 346 n.95. She is not alone in
finding a limited number of common denominators or models. Another careful legal scholar has written: "The
leading theories can be described as textualism, purposivism (intentionalism), and dynamic interpretation
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ism, intentionalism, and dynamic statutory interpretation (along with its cousin, "practi-
cal reason") are highly relevant to this article, they are also briefly discussed.79
The reasons why these particular theories or models dominate are found in the na-
ture of the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. Each of these theo-
ries or models reflects an important chunk of the "heuristics" of statutory interpreta-
tion.80
To summarize by way of preview, textualism is highly relevant to this article be-
cause it employs a reader-centered strategy (or heuristic) for attributing meaning to
statutory text, emphasizing the "meanings" of statutory text as perceived by a reader,8'
and it retains most of the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. Inten-
tionalism is highly relevant because it employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing
meaning to statutory text, emphasizing "meaning(s)" "intended" by the writer,82 and it
retains all of the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. Dynamic
statutory interpretation, practical reason and their relatives are highly relevant because
they recognize that neither textualism nor intentionalism, standing alone, provide an
adequate explanation or theoretical basis for understanding statutory interpretation 83 and
they retain the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
(practical reasoning)." Cavanaugh, Aristotle, supra note 59, at 584.
Other commentary provides:
There are three basic modes of statutory interpretation: 1) textual interpretation; 2) analysis of
legislative intent; and 3) incorporation of extra-legislative values. This categorization empha-
sizes the differences among complete theories of interpretation advocated by individual jurists or
scholars. In fact, any complete theory of interpretation relies on all three modes of interpretation
at one time or another. However, competing theories of interpretation do tend to emphasize a
particular mode: I) textualism emphasizes an analysis of the statutory text; 2) intentionalism
emphasizes inquiry into the intent of the enacting legislature; and 3) public values analysis em-
phasizes incorporation of values into the interpretive process, even if these values were not com-
municated by the enacting legislature.
Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1139-
40 (1992) (footnotes and citations omitted).
78. In many respects, "model" is a far better and more descriptive term than "theory" for describing
textualism, intentionalism, and several other "theories" discussed in the text. The author is indebted to Profes-
sor Gebbia-Pinetti for this term and insight. See Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 234.
79. See infra Part II.B.3.
80. See infra Parts IV, V.B.2-4.
8 1. See infra Part II.B.1.
82. See infra Part II.B.2. No claim of originality is made by this article regarding the insight concerning
reader-centered and writer-centered strategies for reading statutory text. Much the same point has been made
in Singer's treatise on statutory interpretation. "It seems evident that 'intent of the legislature' concentrates
attention upon the 'sending' end of the communication relationship, whereas the 'meaning of the statute'
concentrates attention on the 'receiving' end." See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45:07, 45:39 (6th ed. 2000).
83. See infra Part II.B.3. See also, Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 325
("[Nlone of the three anchors (intent, purpose, text) can altogether exclude the other two.") (emphasis added).
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1. Textualism
If by "textualism" we mean simply that due regard must be given to statutory text,
then everybody is a textualist. No one, to my knowledge, has ever said that we should
totally ignore statutory text. However, to the extent that the "textualism" label implies a
total, or near-total, reliance on statutory text for the attribution of meaning, it is mislead-
ing and downright fraudulent.
Proponents and critics alike agree that textualism does not rely solely on the text of
a disputed statutory provision to attribute "meaning" to the statute. 84 As one of textual-
ism's critics has put it, "While textualists generally avoid legislative history, they freely
consult assorted dictionaries, make use of various linguistic arguments without benefit
of linguistic study, and selectively employ canons of statutory interpretation in their
textual analyses. 85
Nor would it be possible to rely totally on statutory text. As will be discussed
later,86 "meaning" is not something that words "have" or readers "find." "Meaning," in
87the context of written language, is something that we attribute to marks on paper.
"Meaning is what emerges when linguistic and cultural understandings and experiences
are brought to bear on the text. '88 "Meaning is patterns in human brains." 89 We use our
minds when we draw inferences about what a statutory provision "means." We do not
"find" the meaning of statutory language by looking at statutory text. We ourselves at-
tribute "meaning" to those words in light of our own backgrounds. 90
84. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 23-25.
85. Cavanaugh, Aristotle, supra note 59, at 595-96 (footnotes omitted).
86. See infra Part 1IlE-F.
87. See infra Part 11I.A-G.
88. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1990).
89. Mark Turner, Design for a Theory of Meaning, in THE NATURE AND ONTOGENESIS OF MEANING 91,
93 (W. Overton & D. Palermo eds.) (1994).
90. However, Justice Scalia, in an oft-quoted passage, describes his methodology in terms that sound very
much like he does believe that words somehow contain meanings, which the Justices "find": "I thought we had
adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute: first,find the ordinary meaning
of the language in its textual context .... Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia also stated, "A text ... should be construed reasonably, to contain all it
fairly means." SCALIA, supra note 3, at 23 (emphasis added).
True en..gh, it is often harmless to speak of words as "containing" or "having" meaning. There
frequently is remarkable consensus about the "meaning" that we attribute to statutory and other words. When I
say, "I saw a cat in the yard," it is unlikely that anyone will conclude that I am saying that I saw a dog. Often,
therefore, it makes no difference whether we think that words "have" meaning or we realize that we attribute
"meaning" to the words. As one writer has put it, the "intended meaning [sometimes] is so clear that every-
one-including potentially disadvantaged litigants-concedes the proper interpretation of the provision."
Maltz, supra note 61, at 24.
However, when dealing with abstractions-and statutes are abstractions-any theory suggesting that
words "have" meaning can be dangerous. Such suggestions can lull an honest "textualist" into sincerely be-
lieving that he or she objectively attributes "meaning" to statutory text, rather than attributing his or her own
"meaning" to the words. The fact that other Justices happen to agree with that "meaning" (or are willing to go
along with an opinionated Justice) does not change the reality that the textualist has attributed meaning to
words. See infra Part III.A-G. Professor Flood puts it quite well:
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Moreover, apart from a common core of rejecting legislative history,9' it is becom-
ing difficult to say exactly what constitutes modem "textualism." There already are
several different kinds of "textualism," including new textualism, 92 structural textual-
ism,93 pragmatic textualism, 94 "radical textualism, ' '95 and "sympathetic textualism. ' '96 In
any event, as its critics point out, "textualism" by no means limits itself to using only
statutory text.
97
One early description of textualism is highly relevant to the present article, because
it demonstrates that textualism retains most of the traditional concepts and tools of statu-
tory interpretation. Cast in terms of describing Justice Scalia's methodology, this de-
Another circumstance that has prevented the ascension of one theory of interpretation to a posi-
tion above all others is the simple fact that judges are human. As human beings, whether they re-
alize it or not and whether they admit it or not, judges are influenced in every situation by what
they value, what they believe, and what they understand about the world around them. In a di-
verse society, there will always be divergent views about what is right and good and just. A re-
view of the decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the last fifteen months should con-
vince all doubters that it is indeed impossible for justices to completely set aside everything that
makes them who they are, even when they make the best of efforts to do so.
Flood, supra note 2 at 66-67 (footnotes omitted).
91. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, Aristotle, supra note 59, at 595 ("[T]extualists generally avoid legislative his-
tory .... ") (footnote omitted); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated
Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1473-74 (2000) ("Although textualism rejects legislative history, the rise of
textualism has been marked by increased judicial consultation of other extrinsic aids, such as dictionaries. In
fact, when Justice Scalia is in need of interpretive assistance, he sometimes seems to go out of his way to
consult any and all extrastatutory texts, provided they are not legislative history.") (footnote omitted).
92. See, e.g., Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 25, at 621, 625. See generally Lee Epstein et al.,
Dynamic Agenda-Setting On the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 395, 396 n.l (2002).
93. See Taylor, supra note 22, at 321.
94. See Fruehwald, supra note 59, at 974.
95. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation
of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 494 (2001).
96. See James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic
Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 112 (1999).
97. For some of the growing body of work criticizing textualism, see Mank, supra note 38, at 527 (argu-
ing that textualist judges are selective in the canons and other extrinsic aids which they use in statutory inter-
pretation, overusing those which restrict statutory meaning when it will promote federalism and states' rights,
and neglecting those which promote individual liberty and executive authority); William D. Popkin, An "In-
ternal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1992)
(critiquing Justice Scalia's approach to statutory construction from an "internal" legal perspective); Muriel
Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 588 (1994)
("This [a]rticle addresses the textualism controversy in two ways. First, I argue that the debate about the use of
legislative history illuminates a power struggle between Congress and the courts. My thesis is that textualism
enhances judicial power at the expense of Congress' primacy as the authors and masters of statutes, and at the
expense of Congress' right to determine the authoritative sources of statutory meaning.") (footnotes omitted);
Peter L. Strauss, Comment: Legal Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1653, 1656
(1991) (suggesting that "the move to textualism is being orchestrated by recent Republican appointees" with
"political reasons for hostility to Congress relative to the President"). For an article that is almost regretful in
its tone, but all the more damning of textualism because of its tone of regret, see Lawrence M. Solan, Learning
Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 235 [hereinafter Solan, Learning
Our Limits] ("[Blecause the textualist approach is based on an insufficiently sophisticated understanding of the
human language faculty, it fails, regardless of how much one may agree with the considerations that motivate
it.").
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scription baptized the entire movement: The New Textualism. 98 Some of the details,
however, will be omitted here to conserve space:
First, Justice Scalia will consider how the word or phrase is used elsewhere in the
same statute, or how it is used in other statutes...
Second, Justice Scalia will consider how the possible meanings fit with the statute
as a whole. Does one meaning render other provisions duplicative or superfluous? Is
there a structure in the statute, or a pattern of assumptions, that supports one of the
plausible meanings?...
Third, Justice Scalia will rely on the interaction of different statutory schemes to
determine statutory plain meaning. In Jett, for example .... [h]e cited the "principles
of construction that the specific governs the general, and that, where text permits,
statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously."
All of these structural arguments have been used by the Court in the past and so are
hardly unique to the "new" textualism .... 99
Furthermore, "[t]he canons of statutory construction, a homely collection of rules of
thumb for interpreting statutes, have long been used by judges in writing statutory inter-
pretation opinions .... 00
The concepts and tools mentioned above should sound familiar to anyone who has
worked with statutes in any meaningful way. What we have in latter-day textualism is
simply most of the same old concepts and tools of statutory interpretation.'10 There has
been, of course, reshuffling and revisionism, some of which may be strategic. For ex-
ample, there has been an apparent textualist emphasis, and over-emphasis, on the tradi-
tional "canons" of statutory interpretation, such as the very malleable concept of "inclu-
sio unius est exclusio alterius."10 2 This Latin maxim can be translated roughly as "the
express mention of one thing excludes anything else not mentioned." For an example of
98. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 25, at 623-24.
99. Id. at 661-663 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
101. See supra Part II.A. Other descriptions in other articles also indicate that textualism is using many of
the same old concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. For example, textualism will "interpret the words in
a manner consistent with similar phrases in other statutes ... and might consult 'textualist' interpretive canons.
.. ." Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Construction, supra note 60, at 274. "Recourse to other statutes," of course is
the old tool "in pari materia" and the canons of statutory interpretation, whether "textualist" or not, are par of
the traditional judicial methodology described by the courts in statutory interpretation cases. Another descrip-
tion puts it this way:
The new textualist's methodology is simple. Courts should interpret statutes based on the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used in the statute and various rules of grammar and syntax, such as
the interpretive canon that a court must interpret a statute so as to give every word some effect.
If the ordinary meaning of the words and the syntax and grammatical devices do not yield an in-
terpretation, the court should fit the statute into the corpus of the law. Ordinarily, a court should
not refer to legislative history when interpreting a statute.
Bell, supra note 59, at 59 (footnotes omitted).
102. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 25, at 664 ("lnclusio unius arguments have grown like weeds in
a vacant lot during the last two Terms [ 1987-88, 1988-89] of the Court.") (footnote omitted).
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the fallacies luring in inclusio, consider the statement, "I saw a cat in the yard." That
statement tells us absolutely nothing about what else is in the yard and certainly does not
even suggest that there are no trees, shrubs, junked cars, or dead leaves in the yard.
10 3
In addition to textualism's continued use of traditional concepts and tools of statu-
tory interpretation, °'4 there is another aspect of today's textualism that is highly relevant
to the present article. Briefly put, textualism reflects one of the basic strategies, or heu-
ristics, 10 5 for attributing meaning to a written text-already referred to above as a reader
centered strategy or heuristic. 10 6 "[Tihe judge should ask what the ordinary reader of a
statute would have understood the words to mean at the time of enactment, not what the
intentions of the enacting legislators were."' 0 7 (Of course, a number of serious questions
about textualism are embedded in the "ordinary reader" concept, but are beyond the
scope of this article). 10 8
103. The inclusio "canon" essentially involves the negative implications of language. Justice Scalia, in his
essay, tries to make it sound like a very simple precept. "What it means is this: If you see a sign that says
children under twelve may enter free, you should have no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must
pay." SCALIA, supra note 3, at 25. Of course, there are situations where it is a simple matter of twelve-year
olds. However, the negative implications of all statements, especially statements in statutes, are not always
that simple. What if I ask a student to close the door, and there are two doors which are open? Even this simple
example should make it clear that the implications of statutory language can be a very complex matter, not so
easily dealt with as Justice Scalia seems to believe. Justice Souter has given us some very cogent remarks
about inclusio. Inclusio "is notoriously unreliable and does not bear the weight here. While 'often a valuable
servant,' the maxim that the inclusion of something negatively implies the exclusion of everything else (ex-
pressio unius, etc.) is 'a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes.' . . . . [Ojur decisions
support the proposition that [s]ometimes [the canon] applies and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or
does not depends largely on context."' Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 501-02 (1994) (Souter, J. dis-
senting) (citations omitted). See also Mullins, supra note 64, at 27-43. Certainly inclusio is much more com-
plex than Justice Scalia seems to make it to be in his book. In fact, inclusio itself is worthy of a separate arti-
cle, or several articles. See infra Part V.C.
104. See supra Part II.A.2
105. See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.2.
106. See supra Part l.B. Again, I must give credit for this idea to Singer's treatise. See SINGER, supra note
82, §§ 45:07, 45:39.
107. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 352
(1994) (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added). For similar statements, see Mank, supra note 38, at
533-34 ("Textualists believe that interpreters should not focus on the highly subjective issue of the intentions
of the enacting legislators, but instead should assess what the ordinary reader of a statute would have under-
stood the words to mean at the time of enactment to ascertain a statute's 'plain' meaning."); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Textualism] (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 3) ("[Tlhe new textualist starts with the meaning an ordinary
reader would draw from the statutory language.").
108. Those questions involve, but are not limited to: (1) the massive epistemological problems of a term
like "ordinary reader;" (2) the incomplete and therefore misleading dichotomy between the intentions of enac-
tors and the readers of statutes; (3) the simple fact that statutory language is not necessarily "ordinary usage ;"
(4) the danger of mistaking one's own attributed "meaning" for common usage; and probably most crucial, (5)
the misleading way in which such language subsumes an assumption that "meaning" of statutory provisions is
nothing more than the "meaning" of their individual words. Such questions await future articles, which if this
article's suggestions are followed, will be addressed in a kind of scholarship that examines the concepts and
tools of statutory interpretation themselves. See infra Part V.C.
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
As discussed in more detail below, the reader-centered heuristic' °9 is one of the
most basic strategies for reading text. The other is a writer-centered strategy, which
brings us to so-called "intentionalism."
2. Intentionalism
"Intentionalism" signifies reliance to a greater or lesser degree on something called
"legislative intent(ion)." It is typified by judicial statements such as "Our analysis com-
mences with the premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent."'' l Despite a pedigree going back at least to the era of
Blackstone and the first Justice Marshall,"' "intentionalism" has become academically
disreputable, or at least unfashionable, in this era of "new textualism." ' 12 To some ex-
tent, this is understandable. "Intention" strongly connotes a state of mind. This makes
any theory christened "intentionalism" vulnerable to criticisms that conglomerate legis-
lative bodies do not have "intentions.,'' 
3
Moreover, the contours of this "theory" or (more properly speaking) "model" were
never very clear." 14 However, several different varieties of "intentionalism," or the con-
cept of intentionalism by some other name (such as "purposivism"" 5), have been identi-
fied.
109. See infra Part V.B.2-4.
110. Snukal v. Flightways Mfg. 3 P.3d 286, 304 (Cal. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
I II. See supra Part II.A. .b.
112. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 16-18 (criticizing the concept and application of "legislative in-
tent").
113. The classic statement of this is found in Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863,
870 (1929-30) ("The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situa-
tions in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small."). However, at least
two factors complicate the various attempts to discredit "intentionalist theories." First, theories based on "leg-
islative intent" have a strong and understandable appeal in our democratic society, because legislative bodies
are the primary policy-makers in our democratic society, rather than the judiciary. "If the legislature is the
primary lawmaker and courts are its agents, then requiring the courts to follow the legislature's intentions
disciplines judges by inhibiting judicial lawmaking, and in so doing seems to further democracy by affirming
the will of elected representatives." Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 326. There is
much to be said for the idea that courts should be faithful agents of the legislature, and try to carry out the
legislative policies that are reflected in statutes. See e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Inter-
pretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 23-24 (1988). Second, there is the longevity of an "intentionalist" judicial
rhetoric, if not practice. Despite criticism and ridicule, legislative intent and its variants have long been, and
remain, embedded in the judicial vocabulary. As Professor Sinclair put it, "We should not quite so readily
consign the concept of legislative intent to oblivion. After all, many judges have been relying on it in difficult
cases for a very long time, and understanding that doing so was their constitutional duty. Were they really
under some delusion?" Sinclair, supra note 2, at 308. Professor Sinclair, by the way, also has demonstrated
that "intentionalism" can be a very sophisticated theory. See Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, 1351;
see also Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, supra note 2, at 381-82 (1997).
114.. As implied earlier in this article, "legislative intent(ion)" probably is best conceived of as a shorthand
label for what the courts consider if they conclude, or admit, that the statutory language at issue is not plain,
clear, unambiguous, etc. See supra Part II.A. I.b.
115. For example, one writer has implied that "intentionalism" and "purposivism" are so closely related
that they can be used interchangeably. See Cavanaugh, Aristotle, supra note 59, at 582 (referring to "intention-
alism, which we might equally term purposivism"). This is an important insight.
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To take only one example, Professors Eskridge and Frickey, in an important article,
limited themselves-for some reason-to addressing "three different versions of inten-
tionalism."' 16 First, "the actual intent of the legislators who enacted the statute."' 7 This
straw man is unacceptable because, again, conglomerate bodies do not have an actual
intent, in the sense that you or I have a personal, subjective intent." 8
Second, there is a version which they label "conventional" intent, i.e. attribution of
intent or meaning based on inferences from materials such as committee reports and
floor statements." 9 Underlying this category, apparently, is the notion that legislative
"intent" can be attributed to the whole legislature on the basis of statements made in
legislatively authorized records and statements.
Third, they describe a fictionalized kind of intent, which they relate to Richard Pos-
ner's "imaginative reconstruction," under which a judge imagines a reasonable interpre-
tation based on how reasonable legislators would have responded to the interpretive
-'uestion at issue. 20 However (and Judge Posner himself would probably agree), "intent"
as ;eflecting the "intent" of an objectified imagined legislator has long been part of the
statutory interpretation methodologies employed by the courts. A rather famous 19th
century example is found in Riggs v. Palmer,'21 which in turn reaches back to Bacon's
Abridgments as support for conjuring up a reasonable legislator and asking him what to
do.
122
116. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, Practical Reasoning, at 326.
117. Id.
118. However, we often do attribute "meaning" on the basis of what we think some anonymous or collec-
tive author "intended." As Professor Sinclair points out, "Attacks on the notion of the intention of the legisla-
ture presume that this intention is a perfect analogue of the intention of an individual human in giving a direc-
tion or command. Unless something can be found in the legislative process which is equal to the mental proc-
ess or state of the individual, there will be no such thing as legislative intent. But why should we expect the
intent of a legislature to be such perfect analogue of an individual human's intent in the utterance of an order or
direction?" Sinclair, supra note 2, Legislative Intent, at 1351. Another author expressed,
Our frequent references to the intentions and intentional acts of collective bodies suggests that
some alternative conception is already well-established. For example, 'we find no problem in at-
tributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in ordinary life, and the law assumes
that corporations and some other legal subjects who are not human beings can act intentionally.'
John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 430 (2000)
(quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM
249, 263 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). See also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 865 (1992) ("In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities
all the time without many practical difficulties.").
119. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 326-27.
120. Id. at 329-30. See also Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 282-83 (referring to
Judge Posner as a "leading modern advocate of imaginative reconstruction").
121. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (murderer barred from taking under victim's will) (discussed in BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-43 (1921) and RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, 15-
20(1986)).
122. "In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of a statute, it is a good way to
suppose the law-maker present, and that you have asked him this question, did you intend to comprehend this
case? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man,
would have given. If this be that he did mean to comprehend it, you may safely hold the case to be within the
equity of the statute; for while you do no more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the statute,
but in conformity thereto." Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189. A similar prescription for questioning a make-believe law-
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There undoubtedly are more than three varieties of "intentionalism" and "legislative
intent," as used by theorists and the courts. 123 However, the ones already discussed
should be more than enough for introductory purposes.
If we discount for the confusion created by the various concepts of "intention" and
look for common denominators, certain points should emerge. First, as with "textual-
ism," a major problem is the misleading nature of a label. "Intentionalism's" connota-
tions lead us conceptually astray. We drift into thinking in terms of subjective individual
mental states. But at bottom, "intentionalism" merely reflects a willingness to recognize
that, even if statutory text seems very clear, there may be other indications (often loosely
called "legislative intent") that a non-obvious meaning should be attributed to that text.
Probably the best description of the concept is found, again, in the following passage
from a currently neglected (but not entirely neglected) case: "When aid to construction
of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no
'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination."
24
Second, when there is uncertainty about meaning, "intentionalism" is almost con-
gruent with the entire body of traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
"Intentionalism," in fact, not only retains but also embodies those concepts and tools.
Third, just as today's "textualism" embodies a reader-centered strategy or heuristic
for attributing "meaning" to a statutory text, intentionalism is a "writer-centered" strat-
egy or heuristic for attributing "meaning."' 125 There is nothing particularly deep or eso-
teric about this, even though the word "heuristic" is used to describe the phenomenon. A
"writer-centered" (or speaker-centered) strategy is a common phenomenon in every-day
discourse. For example, while discussing a medical malpractice case in class, the profes-
sor may mis-speak by referring to the "practice of law," when he intended to say "the
practice of medicine." His intended meaning is clear enough to most of the students,
who know from experience that he frequently makes such mistakes. 26 Moreover, this
attribution of meaning on the basis of the speaker's intent is not limited to figuring out
maker is attributed to Plowden. See Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 1329.
Justice Scalia also recognizes an "objectified" form of legislative intent. Although this article does not
agree with him entirely, he writes, "The evidence suggests that ... we [the courts] do not really look for sub-
jective legislative intent. We look for a sort of 'objectified" intent-the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris." SCALIA, supra note 3, at
17. It is more likely that courts often, but not always, write in terms of an objectified or fictionalized intent.
123. Professor Gebbia-Pinetti splits it up a bit differently, with two kinds of subjective intentionalism and
purposivism. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 281-84. Professor Campos has used
the term "strong intentionalism" to describe theories where authorial intent is dominant. Paul Campos, That
Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1083-95
(1993).
124. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (footnotes omitted). See also
supra Part II.A.l.a.
125. See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.4.
126. If my intended meaning is not clear, the students immediately can interrupt me and get clarification.
This point distinguishes the professor from the legislative body, and is the source of a lot of problems and
complications in the statutory interpretation setting.
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an individual's verbal lapses. Even where there is no single or known author, we still
use a "writer-centered" strategy for attributing meaning in obvious, and not so obvious,
cases. Consider the perennially purported newspaper headline: "Enraged Cow Injures
Farmer with Ax."'127 We realize, after blinking a time or two, that there probably was no
ax-wielding cow. We know what any anonymous head-line writer(s) intended to mean,
assuming that there ever was such a headline. We also know that informed readers
would interpret the words in the context of knowledge which they have in common with
the writer(s)-a cow does not wield an ax. Here, as with many other cases, the "reader-
centered" and "writer-centered" strategies for attributing "meaning" would coincide.
128
In fact, among the tools and reference points we use in attributing meaning, we are
perhaps more likely to ask, as a touchstone for attributing meaning to textual words,
"what was intended?" than "what is the common usage of the words?"' 129 Everyday ex-
perience is admissible here. We simply are accustomed to attributing meaning on the
basis of what we think or assume a "speaker" intended. We do it every day. It is only
reasonable to assume that we do the same thing when we are processing or disambiguat-
ing written text, even statutory text.
Summing up, "intentionalism" generally is a writer-centered strategy, which fo-
cuses on attributing (often unconsciously 130 ) to the words a meaning that the author-
even an anonymous or collective author-would have intended. 13 1 With regard to statu-
tory interpretation, then, there really is nothing novel about recognizing this point. As
already mentioned, one can find something very similar to it in the leading multi-volume
United States treatise on statutes and statutory interpretation.1
32
Attributing meaning on the basis of "intended" meaning or intended consequences
is no worse (and no better) than attributing meaning on the basis of what we think the
"ordinary" reader would attribute to the language. 133 There is no "ordinary reader." The
ordinary reader is a mental construct, a first cousin to the "reasonable person" in torts.
Legislative "intent(ion)" is a mental construct. Both the "ordinary reader" and "legisla-
127. Reported, among other such headlines, in the humor column, Michael Storey, Otis the Head Cat,
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, April 12, 1997 at 3E. See also, Sinclair, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at
1351-59 (noting that "intent" in the collective entity or enterprise context is not necessarily identical to indi-
vidual subjective intent, and discussing theories of collective intent).
128. The situations where reader-centered and writer-centered strategies for attributing meaning coincide
are not limited to the simple example of ax-wielding cows. As at least one writer has recognized, "Textual
meaning and authorial intention are not separable concepts, and searching for one is by necessity synonymous
with seeking the other." Campos, supra note 123, at 1091.
129. For a fairly concise, but critical discussion of a theory that authorial intent is actually a dominant
mode of interpretation, see id. at 1084-95 (discussing Fish and Perry, among others).
130. See infra Parts Il.A, V.B.2.b.
131. We read far more "collective" writings each day than we realize. The infamous "Bluebook" readily
comes to mind. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (17th ed. 2000). Other examples are
abundant. For example, newspaper reportage is not written solely by reporters themselves. There is an editing
process that involves a whole section of any large daily newspaper. See e.g., Leacock Is Promoted on State
Journal News Staff, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, September 22, 2002 at C2 (referring to "supervising the
copy desk, which is responsible for editing news stories and writing headlines").
132. SINGER, supra note 82, §§ 45:07, 45:39.
133. See supra Part I.B.I.
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tive intent(ion)" are fictions. Both are mental tools, strategies, or heuristics for resolving
indeterminate meanings or validating what appears to be a "plain meaning."
'134
3. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Practical Reasoning
Among the most academically influential theories of the late 20th century are "dy-
namic statutory interpretation" and its close relative, practical reasoning (or pragma-
tism). 35 Neither are self-explanatory on their face, but both are highly relevant to this
article because they leave untouched (and largely unexamined) most of the traditional
concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. According to the creator of dynamic statu-
tory interpretation, at least in his original manifesto, "Interpretation is not static, but
dynamic. Interpretation is not an archeological discovery, but a dialectical creation.
Interpretation is not mere exegesis to pinpoint historical meaning, but hermeneutics to
apply that meaning to current problems and circumstances.' 36
As he put it in a later work, "interpretation is dynamic, in the sense that the meaning
of a statute will change as social context changes, as new interpreters grapple with the
statute, and as the political context changes."'' 37 Apparently he means that: (1) judges
inevitably import their own experience into the context used when applying statutes; and
(2) we should not necessarily be tied to any notion that a statutory provision must be
interpreted in accordance with the original meaning or intent that the enacting legislator
(or "ordinary reader" at the time of enactment) would have attributed to it. 138
To that extent, the dynamic theory may be adding something new, because, under
traditional tools and concepts of statutory construction, the intention of the enacting
legislature or the original meaning of the statutory language, rather than the meaning
that we today would attribute to it, controls. 39 However, in other respects, this dynamic
134. See infra Part V.B.2-4.
135. As noted infra Part II.B.3, dynamic statutory interpretation theory and practical reasoning are closely
related, if for no other reasons than that they have common authors, and a propensity in common to use most
of the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
136. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 1482 (emphasis added).
137. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at 199.
138. The United States Supreme Court does not seem to agree with this argument. See AMOCO Prod. Co.
v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999) (holding that Congress did not intend to include coal-
bed methane gas when using the word "coal" in statutes enacted in 1909 and 1910 reserving coal mining
rights, even though the "meaning" of coal today, scientifically, may include methane trapped in solid coal-
beds).
139. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 919 P.2d 731, 737 (Cal. 1996) ("The words of a statute are to be interpreted
in the sense in which they would have been understood at the time of the enactment.") However, this generali-
zation is subject to a flotilla of exceptions and refinements. Dynamic statutory interpretation theory, which
seems to change only the basic concept of courts' being limited to the meaning or intention at the time of
enactment, may be overkill, because the traditional concept is so full of loopholes. See, e.g., Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Corp. v. Mondzelewski, 115 A.2d 697, 700 (Del. 1955) ("It is an elementary rule of statutory construction
that legislative enactments couched in general terms broad enough to include conditions that the future may
bring forth apply to the new conditions if they come within the general purview of the statute.").
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theory does not depart from-or explain-the traditional judicial methodologies as de-
scribed by the courts.' 4°
Likewise, "practical reason," or pragmatism, a theory endorsed by the creator of
dynamic statutory interpretation and one of his close colleagues,"4 1 and by other aca-
demics worthy of attention,14 2 expressly retains the traditional concepts and tools of
statutory interpretation, while recognizing the reality of a judge's inevitable tendency to
read a statute in light of his or her own contemporary background. As described by a
pair of its capable proponents, some of the factors considered in a practical reasoning
approach to statutory interpretation include the time-honored statutory text and related
concepts:
Textual analysis starts with the specific words of the statutory provision being inter-
preted. The interpreter should approach the statutory text as a reasonably intelligent
reader would and give the text its most commonsensical reading. That reading should
be sensitive to any special senses the words have acquired, and should also consider
the placement of words in the sentence, and even the punctuation of the sentence.
Textual analysis should further consider how the statutory provision at issue coheres
with the general structure of the statute, since other provisions in the statute might
shed light on the one being interpreted.1
43
The discussion continues, touching on some other familiar concepts and tools: e.g.,
legislative intent, legislative history, imaginative reconstruction, legislative purpose.' 44
The problem is that, again, such theories of "practical reason," while adding a few no-
tions (such as "evolutive considerations" 45), largely restate what the courts have been
doing for two hundred years, 146 without examining in any detail the basic nature of the
basic concepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
140. In describing the process of statutory interpretation, this author depicts the statutory interpreter as
sliding "up and down the funnel." ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at 56.
This "funnel" is just a diagram in form of a large "V," with labels along its sides. Most of the labels them-
selves are familiar to those who work with statutes. For example, there is "statutory text," "Whole Act and
Integration into Structure of Law," "Imaginative Reconstruction" (a.k.a. one version of "legislative intent"),
and "Legislative Purpose." Although the "funnel" adds a few new labels, such as "Evolution of Statute" and
"Current Values," which seem unique to his dynamic theory, Professor Eskridge overall describes the statutory
interpreter's methodology in familiar terms. For example, he describes the process as "considering the
strengths of various considerations ... weighing them against one another along conventional criteria." Id. All
of this differs little from conventional descriptions of what is to be considered in statutory interpretation cases.
See supra Part II.A.I.
14 1. See Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 326.
142. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of
Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992).
143. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 354-55 (citations omitted). The funnel of
abstraction also appears here, suggesting again that the differences between dynamic statutory interpretation
and theories of "practical reason" are marginal. Id. at 353-54.
144. Id. at 355-57.
145. Id. at 358-62.
146. See supra Part II.A.2. It does add the notion that contemporary circumstances and values play a role in
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As with "dynamic statutory interpretation," however, such "practical reasoning"
theories are important because they recognize that neither "textualism" nor "intentional-
ism" provide, by themselves, a satisfactory theory. "None of the three anchors (intent,
purpose, text) can altogether exclude the other two.' 147
4. Some New Directions in Statutory Interpretation Theory
The "vibrant scholarly debate about statutory interpretation"'' 48 has not resulted in
any consensus, among either the academics or the courts. 14 9 As one important writer has
put it, "a sense grows that no single approach-purposivism, Republicanism, or textual-
ism-can explain statutory interpretation. A 'pragmatic' mood has set in, giving each
,,150
approach its due ....
As early as 1993, a prophetic, but somewhat neglected, article by Professor Robert
Martineau foresaw the problems inherent with much contemporary theorizing about
statutory interpretation. He asserted that:
The unstated premise of those who develop or write about the grand theories is that
judges decide or should decide statutory construction cases on the basis of a grand
theory. The task of the scholar [espousing a grand theory] is to discover the grand
theory that was used in deciding past cases or that should be used in deciding future
cases. Whatever the purpose, the scholars use appellate court opinions to develop and
demonstrate their theses. '
51
statutory interpretation (at least unconsciously). But it does not explain anything about the concepts and tools
which the courts use, or say they use, in carrying out the enterprise of statutory interpretation.
147. Eskridge and Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 9, at 325.
148. Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585,
588 (1994).
149. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2 at 81. In addition, Professor Araujo observes:
[W]e have become awash in theories and meta-theories. But on closer scrutiny, we see that many
* of these writers who have offered theories of interpretation (whether they be academics, judges,
or practitioners) have advocated or preferred one particular theory of interpretation over others.
The spectrum of theories (and, consequently my critique) ranges from plain meaning, originalist,
textualist, intentionalist, purposivist, contextualist or dynamist. At the outset, I suggest two
things about these theories of legal interpretation. First, each has something of value to offer to
the interpreter who tackles a public legal text in order to ascertain its meaning. Second, each of
these approaches tends to exclude important, even vital, aspects of the interpretive enterprise so
that something essential to the discernment of the text's meaning is lost ....
Araujo, supra note 2, at 226-27 (footnotes omitted).
150. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 52, at 153.
151. Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of
Statutory Construction, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. I, 23 (1993) [hereinafter Martineau, Craft and Technique]
(emphasis added).
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Professor Martineau, a true authority on the appellate process,'1 2 tried to explain to
us that appellate courts simply do not decide cases on the basis of some "grand theory."
Nor is a written judicial opinion the detailed, official account of the thought processes of
the deciding appellate judges. The judicial opinion is "a reasoned justification of the
decision prepared after the decision is made. The principal purpose of the opinion is to
make the decision appear consistent with the facts and the relevant statutory and judicial
authority."'
'5 3
Part of his message seems to be that we cannot construct a worthwhile theory about
a human activity by disregarding the realities behind that activity, or by treating that
activity as a set of abstract "-isms." Or, as Professor Sinclair has tried bluntly to remind
us, "Theories must account for data."'
154
There are indications that statutory interpretation theory is moving more in this
direction. Professors Clark Kelso and Charles D. Kelso suggest that "[W]e have been
asking the wrong question and searching for the wrong answer."'155 The Kelsos, along
with at least two other important writers, suggest that theories should focus on statutory
interpretation as part of the larger enterprise of "judging.' ' 56 As the Kelsos also say:
First, statutory interpretation is a process engaged in by judges who are, after all,
only human. The process of deriving meaning from words, which lies at the heart of
statutory interpretation, is a peculiarly individual one. Computers can be programmed
to mimic a process of interpretation, but that does not mean that each individual's
process of interpretation is the same or can be made the same....
Second, a judge or court may not so much engage in a process of statutory interpre-
tation as make a decision about the meaning of a statute. The difference is a subtle,
but important one.I17
Recognizing that statutory interpretation is a very complex and human process is a
crucial step. The next step, it would seem, should be to consider human behavior, or at
least the cognitive processes involved in statutory interpretation.1
5 8
152. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL
APPEALS (1983); ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1990).
153. Martineau, Craft and Technique, supra note 15 1, at 27.
154. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, supra note 2, at 305.
155. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 82.
156. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 83 (hypothesizing "that actual methods of statutory interpretation
used by judges are more closely aligned with a particular judge's overall approach to decision-making than
with independent theories of statutory interpretation"); POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 52, at 207-46
(discussing what he christens "ordinary judging"); Gebbia-Pineti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at
236, 242-57 (interpreting statutes to accord with legal-systems values).
157. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 83.
158. In other areas of legal studies, there already is a strong movement, often referred to as "behavioral-
ism," which is turning to insights from cognitive psychology, decision theory and related fields. See, e.g.,
Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior. Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 5I
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). See also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
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Professor Dan Simon has written that "The nature of judicial reasoning is inextrica-
bly related to the mental processes operative in the making of judicial decisions. Thus,
to understand the central features of judicial reasoning one must investigate the cogni-
tive operations through which these decisions are made."' 159 Although discussing judicial
decision making in general, Professor Simon's article necessarily addresses many of the
same cognitive concerns and processes that are at work in statutory interpretation. The
author of the present article owes much to Professor Simon and others whose efforts
coincide with the direction of this author's thinking and research over the past decade.'60
It must immediately be emphasized, of course, that insights from psychology and
decision theory are not fool-proof. They are especially fragile in the hands of a legal
academic, such as the author of this article, who lacks systematic education in those
disciplines. However, it seems both natural and necessary to consider the relevance to
statutory interpretation of scientific disciplines which inquire into human mental proc-
esses and are subject to some empirical rigor and the scientific method.
Few of us are qualified scientists, but all of us can use insights from more scientific
disciplines to study and think about the problems involved in statutory interpretation.
Statutory interpretation is an enterprise very much involving the human mind, with all
its limitations.
Moreover, if there is one thing to learn from trying to study materials from the sci-
entific disciplines, it is that the sciences move cautiously, insisting upon experiment or
other empirical evidence, and even then remaining subject to conflicting theories and
contentions.' 6' The ordinary article in a scientific publication does not make sweeping
claims, does not announce a "grand theory," and does not set out prescriptions for deci-
sion makers (such as the courts). One is struck, when reading some of the original scien-
tific literature in the cognitive disciplines, with the very narrow and careful nature of the
procedures used and the conclusions reached. 162
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (providing a survey of the
literature); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2000)
(referring to the movement as "law and behavioral science").
159. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18 (1998).
160. See Mullins, supra note 64, at II n.5 (quoting and citing, among others, LYLE E. BOURNE, JR., ET AL.,
COGNITIVE PROCESSES 157 (1979)). See supra notes 158, 159; see generally infra Part IV.
161. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1575
(2000) ("Scientists recognize that what matters most is the explanatory power of the proffered theory and how
well the data support the theory.").
162. See, e.g., Edward E. Smith et al., Category Membership, Similarity, and Naive Induction, in 2 FROM
LEARNING PROCESSES TO COGNITIVE PROCESSES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM K. ESTES 181, 189-92
(Alice F. Healy, et al. eds., 1992) (describing experiment involving subjects' perceptions of similarities and
dissimilarities among mammals to evaluate proposed explanatory models); Walter Kinsch, How Readers
Construct Situation Models for Stories: The Role of Syntactic Cues and Causal Inferences, in 2 FROM
LEARNING PROCESSES TO COGNITIVE PROCESSES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM K. ESTES 181, 261 (Alice F.
Healy, et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the "literature" on discourse comprehension). For a more generally avail-
able work containing a number of such scientific articles relevant to, and influential on, this article, see
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter
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This article, admittedly, is not "scientific" in this sense. However, it does try to con-
sider some data, and make observations about, the concepts and tools of statutory inter-
pretation in light of common sense and insights from sources that may tell us something
about how our minds process the written word and deal with making decisions under
conditions of uncertainty. 1
63
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: COMPLEXITIES AND DECISION MAKING UNDER
CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
Statutory interpretation involves some of the most complex and problematic mental
processing that ordinary lawyers and judges are called upon to perform.' 64 Many of the
complexities and sources of uncertainty are obvious enough. Every statute is different.
Every fact pattern is different. 165 Every case applying reasonably disputable general
statutory language to a particular fact pattern is a difficult problem to be solved, and
difficult problem solving is unavoidably messy and complex. Even Aristotle, in a much
simpler age, recognized the core problem of applying generally worded laws to specific
factual disputes: "[T]he general principle must be stated in writing, the action taken
depends upon the individual case."'
166
Moreover, the complexity of statutory interpretation is not always fully appreciated
because it is rooted in the often-unconscious ways in which we mentally process lan-
guage, especially written language. To further complicate matters, statutory words are
written in a particular, even unique, sort of context-the legislative process-and then
applied or "read" in a very different context-the judicial process.
In order to appreciate the complexity, and some of the sources of uncertainty, in-
volved in statutory interpretation, we should begin by considering a few basic points
about mental processing, words, reading, comprehension, and statutes.
A. Complexities and Uncertainties Related to Unconscious Mental Processing
To begin with, the very act of reading is complex, uncertain, and fallible, partly be-
cause much of the mental processing involved is unconscious. This is a major paradox.
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY],
163. For a leading and accessible work on cognitive psychology and decision making under conditions of
uncertainty, see SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993) (winner of
the William James Book Award). See also JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162.
164. See generally infra Part Ill.
165. See infra Part 111.1.
166. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 138 (Bk. II, ch. viii) (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1951). For another example from
Aristotle, "the laws, if rightly established, ought to be sovereign, and also that officials ... ought to have
sovereign powers to act in all those various matters about which the laws cannot possibly give detailed guid-
ance; for it is never easy to frame general regulations regarding every particular." Id. at 206 (emphasis
added). A slightly different translation of this quotation refers, in pertinent part, to "matters on which law is
unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronounce-
ment." ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 127 (Bk. III, xi) (Ernest Barker trans., 1958).
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Our minds constantly disambiguate sounds and written marks without being fully aware
of the processing involved. 67 As Professor Simon points out, a great deal of our mental
processing generally is not entirely conscious. 68 (It must be emphasized immediately
that we are not talking about any kind of Freudian theories of the unconscious here. We
are merely talking about the simple fact that we are not consciously aware of all of our
mental processing. 169)
Moreover, when we disambiguate the sounds or the marks on paper, each of us will
have different mental pictures regarding those sounds and marks. A common sense
demonstration can be conducted in a classroom to verify this. I sometimes tell my stu-
dents to close their eyes. Then I say something like, "On my way to work this morning, I
saw a cat." Then I quickly tell them to open their eyes and describe whatever they visu-
alized. Most of them visualized a cat, but no two individuals have yet visualized the
167. For example, consider a few sentences which are part of a brief narrative. "(I) John is a programmer
who works for a large corporation. (2) John entered his manager's office. (3) He was sitting at his desk. (4)
John asked for a raise. (5) He wanted to buy a home computer for his child with the money." KATHLEEN
DAHLGREN, NAIVE SEMANTICS FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 3 (1988). As the writer then tells
us, "Just these few words call up a small but rich naive theory of the world, the theory associated with busi-
ness, the social roles and relations within it, the field of computer programming, family relations, and so on."
Id. (citation omitted).
168. See Simon, supra note 158, at 21.
In sum, judicial decisions are determined by legal materials that are restructured [internally in
the judge's mind] in turn by the processes of making the decision.... It is very important to note
that judges are mostly unaware of the cognitive processes that are responsible for the restructur-
ing of the legal materials. They are also generally unaware that their evaluation of the materials
is effected by the coherence bias.... Furthermore, judges tend not to recognize that these ex-
periences are mostly a product of their mental process; instead, they misattribute them to the law
itself."
Id. at 21. See also Solan, Learning Our Limits, supra note 97, at 237 ("We use contextual information and
knowledge of prototypes in everyday speech and understanding, and we use this information automatically and
unselfconsciously.").
169. See John F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, 237 SCIENCE 1445, 1447 (1987) ("Now it is clear
that there are circumstances under which the meanings and implications of events can be unconsciously ana-
lyzed as well. Thus people may reach conclusions about events ... and act on these judgments without being
able to articulate the reasoning by which they were reached."). See also PAWEL LEWICKI, NONCONSCIOUS
SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING ix (1986) ("The research program presented in this book began with
observations which suggest that nonconscious acquisition and processing of information play a major role in
human development and adjustment."). Professor Lewicki's studies also drew a connection to research on
"implicit learning," which, among other things proposes "that complex structures, such as those underlying
language, socialization, perception, and sophisticated games are acquired implicitly and unconsciously ...."
Id. at 21 (citations omitted). For another relevant article cited by Professor Lewicki in his book, see A.S.
Reber, et al., Syntactic Learning and Judgments: Still Unconscious and Still Abstract, 114 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL 17-24 (1985).
For another work touching on the unconscious nature of much mental processing, see UNINTENDED
THOUGHT (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds. 1989). In the Introduction to that book, the editors made
the following interesting points:
Up to the mid-1970s or so, information processing approaches to the study of learning and
memory ... did essentially assume that a person had a rational, logical, and intentional control
over the flow of thought and decisional output.... But by ... 1975 ... these assumptions were
under attack. Cognitive models were being developed in which the information processing in-
volved in reading or answering questions about category membership were seen as largely un-
controlled, automatic, 'spreading activation' phenomena. ...
Id. at xiii-xiv (citations omitted).
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same cat.170 None of them has ever visualized an elephant-but it is possible. The hu-
man mind can be very contrary. But most of them visualize something which their
classmates probably would recognize as a cat. (The way in which our minds use "proto-
types" in communicating concepts such as "cats" at least partially explains this phe-
nomenon.' 7')
Unconscious mental processing and individualized internal responses certainly are
not limited to ordinary language in ordinary settings. They are found also in a more
complex phenomenon: the expert's ability to readily understand passages of written
language that the rest of us find incomprehensible. Experts in a particular field, such as
taxation, environmental law, or banking law, often will agree that the "meaning" of a
particular statutory provision is unambiguous, even though the rest of us are bewildered
and reduced to guessing about the same provision. The expert has a lot of background
information, which forms a context-largely unconscious-rendering the "meaning"
plain to the expert.
72
A powerful example of expertise unconsciously influencing the interpretation of
statutory language may lurk in an article by Edward L. Rubin. 73 This article was not
about statutory interpretation directly, but about administrative "discretion" and (among
other things) German banking regulations. 74 German banking regulators had insisted to
170. Some students, of course, may have ignored the cat and visualized the professor on the way to work in
his 1966 Mustang. This only reinforces the point in the text, however. Confronted with a statement, people
visualize different things in reaction to that statement. Moreover, some students might visualize nothing, or
perhaps refuse to admit they had visualized anything.
171. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 66 (1998) (discuss-
ing linguistic prototype theory in relation to criminal statutory interpretation). See infra Parts III.C, Il.H, 111.1,
V.B.3.
172. At a more scientific level, the "meanings" attributed to words by experts often are discussed in terms
of "schema." "Background information therefore provides a meaningful context for the acquisition of new
information. This information provides a conceptual structure or schema that contains the implications of facts
and bits of information that seem unrelated when read by a person with little background knowledge."
MARGARET W. MATLIN, COGNITION 288 (3d ed. 1994) (effect of background information in the reading
process) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MATLIN, COGNITION]. See also JOHN B. BEST, COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 447 (1986) ("For the last several years, cognitive psychologists have come to appreciate that the
knowledge of the expert is probably organized differently from knowledge in the mind of the novice.") [here-
inafter BEST, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY].
For some law review discussions of expertise, see Session 2: Training the Creative Problem Solver,
37 CAL. W. L. REV. 51, 60-62 (2000); Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate:
Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1284-90 (1999) (discussing
the nature of expertise); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 821-23 (1993) (discussing expertise and "practical reason"); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
549, 560 (2002) ("Expertise produces a useful set of schema to guide decisionmaking, but like all schema,
they limit a decisionmaker's ability to think differently about a problem and to recognize the limitations inher-
ent in the schema.").
173. Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).
174. As Professor Rubin describes his project and its surprising data:
This article employs a case study of bank supervision in ... Germany and a comparison of the
German view of administrative discretion ... with the American view of our own supervision
process. The most startling aspect of this comparison, from the American perspective, is that the
German officials claim they have no discretion at all; they assert that all their actions are deter-
mined by law.
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Professor Rubin that they had no "discretion" about applying a particular statute because
"their activities were fully specified in the seventy-five page, large print, single column
Banking Act."'175 Professor Rubin made it very clear that the "meanings" of many of
those statutory provisions were far from self-evident in their application to particular
situations, but the regulators were reluctant to agree with him. 76 It turned out that the
regulators shared a common and very specialized background of expert knowledge.
They had gone through two or three extra years of intensified training at a special
school. 177 From Professor Rubin's point of view, "The question, then, is how a group of
reasonable, intelligent people can persuade themselves of such an implausible, albeit
much-desired, view of their own level of discretion."'178 From our point of view, how-
ever, the matter is not just one of administrative discretion. Another (but not necessarily
conflicting) assessment is available. In our terms, these regulators were unconsciously
using a lot of internalized information. They had a much broader-and not fully con-
scious--context for ascribing "meaning." They considered many of the statutory provi-
sions to be clear, and their discretion correspondingly limited, because they knew much
more than the bare bones of the statutory language. The substantive "meanings," which
they asserted to be in the statutory language, were a matter of what they already knew.
They had imbibed a lot of information during a lot of extra training.
A lesson to be drawn at this juncture is that, no matter how "plain" or "clear and
unambiguous" a passage of statutory language may seem to be, there are a lot of very
real complexities, uncertainties, and risks of error involved in attributing "meaning" to
that language. Even when a judge acts in utmost good faith, striving to attribute "ordi-
nary meaning" to the words, there is always a possibility of error, because the "plain
meaning" of a statutory provision is being inferred from a lot of unconscious mental
processing which uses a lot of unconscious mental background. Unconscious mental
Id. at 1299-1300 (emphasis added); cf. Part lI.B.2 (discussing Textualism and its implied reliance, and actual
non-reliance, on pure statutory text).
175. Rubin, supra note 173, at 1325 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 1299-1300.
177. As Professor Rubin describes the situation:
When people are hired to be bank regulators in Germany, they are sent to a special "univer-
sity" in Hachenburg, run by the Bundesbank. High school graduates, that is, twenty-year olds
with a baccalaureate degree, are trained at this institution for three years; university graduates
with practical experience are trained for two years. The training is conducted by specialized staff
members of the Bundesbank. There are no course books and no theoretical instruction. Instead,
the students are taught the rules and procedures of their particular role for the entire two or three
year period.
In light of this extended training period, the absence of detailed statutory or regulatory in-
structions in Germany no longer seems quite so astonishing. No such instructions are required to
ensure administrative regularity. Two or three years of full-time training in the specifics of one's
job, at a relatively isolated facility devoted solely to that purpose, will produce regularity quite
nicely.
Id. at 1330-31 (footnotes and citations omitted).
178. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the egocentric bias and related biases, see infra Part
V.B.2.b.
2003]
Journal of Legislation
processing-and internal certainty about "meaning"-is very fallible and the subject of
considerable uncertainty.' 
79
B. Complexities and Uncertainties from the Symbolic and Arbitrary Nature of Words
Next, there is the confounding problem of words themselves. It is widely recog-
nized and conceded that written words have no inherent meaning.' 8° "Words are only
meaningless marks on paper or random sounds in the air until we posit an intelligence
which selected and arranged them."' 8' If you don't believe this, try to read the simplest
passage in a language with which you are totally unfamiliar-for most of us, this could
be Arabic or Chinese. Written words, in short, are symbols. They have no particular
sanctity, much less any inherent "meaning." It's all going on inside our heads.
182
A couple of generations ago, we seemed to be on the way to understanding this.
Words are symbols. "The word is not the thing"'183 which it symbolizes. The map is not
the territory.' 84 If we imbue these symbols with some kind of mystical power over us,
we forget that words not only are symbols but also are nothing more than a means to an
end-communication. They also are imperfect tools for communication. Justice Frank-
furter realized this, referring to words as "clumsy tools.'
85
179. For an example of overconfidence in one's own ability to discern the "plain meaning" of a statutory
provision, see the neolithic majority opinion in Robinson v. Shell Oil, 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd 519
U.S. 337 (1997). There, the Court of Appeals insisted that the word "employee" simply could not include
"former employee" in the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that the statutory language at issue was ambiguous and "interpreted" the word "employee" to include a
former employee who had been the subject of later adverse communications to a potential future employer.
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997).
180. See, e.g., John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
263, 433 (2000). The author asserts:
Indeed, we could not recognize something as a word, rather than as merely a contour (or range
of contours) of sounds or a certain form (or range of forms) of scribblings if we were not aware
that sounds and scribblings with such contours and forms have a significance, function, or value
resulting from the growth or stipulation of such conventions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
181. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objec-
tions and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988).
182. The process going on inside our own heads is, of course, not totally unconscious and subjective. The
mental processing gains some objectivity because it is affected by the conventions of the "language communi-
ties" to which we belong. However, the incorporation and operation of those conventions still is likely to be
unconscious in many respects. For some discussion of interpretive communities and statutory interpretation
see Blatt, Interpretive Communities, supra note 59 (advancing a theory that interpretation should be in accor-
dance with the "interpretive communities" involved under the particular statute); Peter C. Schanck, The Only
Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38
KAN. L. REV. 815, 835-39 (1990) (discussing conventionalism and interpretive communities). "In this in-
stance, the definition of 'farm products' is lexically clear because there is a consensus in all potentially rele-
vant language communities that the soybeans qualify as crops, one of the subcategories into which the defined
category has been divided by the drafters." Julian B. McDonnell, Definition and Dialogue in Commercial
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 623, 643 (1995).
183. S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 24 (4th ed. 1978)
184. Id. at 25.
185. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 546 (1947).
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At a cerebral level, then, we all know that words are symbols, lacking any inherent
"meaning," and that most words are imprecise. 186 But we keep forgetting this simple
point. We ignore the major complexities and uncertainties involved in translating a set
of symbols written by someone else, in a different setting, and perhaps in a different era,
into "meaning" in our own minds.
87
C. Complexities from the Imprecision of Words Generally
As symbols, words usually are imprecise. "Cat" does not precisely identify any par-
ticular animal. 88 It is an abstract category into which we mentally "put" a creature
which we identify as a cat. 189 As approximations and abstractions, words symbolize
whole classes of objects (or behaviors) and even collections of abstractions. Conse-
quently, we can be precise only in our own minds. "Our dog Bitsy" conjures up a picture
(or cascade of pictures' 9° ) in the minds of those who know the particular dog. However,
someone who has never seen "our dog Bitsy" has no mental picture of the dog herself.
The name, "Bitsy," conjures up the image of a small dog, but "Bitsy" might be an ironic
or whimsical name for a St. Bernard.' 9'
The more we think about words, the worse the complications and uncertainties be-
come. Words can give our minds the illusion of being precise, but generally they are
mere approximations. Words are a great illusion-maker, but they are necessary. They
help us communicate, but they give us an illusion of precision, when what we have are a
mere range of possibilities.
186. See supra Part III.A-B.
187. For one of many examples of remarks which seem oblivious to the uncertainties involved in reading,
consider the following: "A text . . . should be construed reasonably, to contain all it fairly means." SCALIA,
supra note 3, at 23.
188. HAYAKAWA, supra note 183, at 156-57.
189. According to one important theory in cognitive psychology, people decide whether a particular item
belongs to a particular category by comparing that item to a "prototype." However, this does not mean that
membership in a particular abstract category, such as cat, is always obvious or clear-cut. For example, robins
and sparrows are prototypical birds, but an ostrich is not. MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 224. "[A]
category tends to have a graded structure, beginning with the most representative or prototypical members and
continuing on through the categories nonprototypical members . t..." Id. Professor Solan has given us one of
the more cogent discussions of prototype theory available in the law reviews. Solan, supra note 171, at 67-75.
Among other things, he points out that "prototype theory correctly predicts that concepts will become fuzzy at
the margins." Id. at 67 (discussing the concepts behind the word, "drizzle"); see also, Solan, Learning Our
Limits, supra note 97, at 237-38 (discussing the use of contextualism and prototypes relative to textualism).
190. I may for example visualize her in a series of mental images-as I saw her this morning, or as a
puppy, or at a time when she was sick, etc. In other words, the picture in my mind is not static. Even in our
own minds, therefore, we will be imprecise because the items symbolized by words will not conjure up a fixed
image or completely stable network of associations. For one description of a psychological model of mental
activity which may be related to this phenomenon, see BEST, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 172, at
193-96 (1986) (spreading activation model).
191. In order for the passage in text to have a "plain meaning," or even be intelligible, the reader must
already know what a St. Bernard is. If the text above had alluded to some other large, but unfamiliar breed,
many readers would not have understood it. Unfortunately, when drafting statutes, one sometimes must use
abstract and even unfamiliar terms and reference points. We inevitably encounter the "use of undefined defin-
ing terms." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (discussing "substantial evidence").
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D. Complexities from the Very Approximate Nature of Statutory Words
Statutory words, in particular, are approximations. 192 Sometimes they are mental
constructs generalizing from tangible things, such dogs and birds. But even there, com-
plications and nagging uncertainties of meaning can arise. Dogs and birds, after all, are
still categories, mental constructs, and abstractions. 193 Moreover, key statutory words
often are symbols denoting very abstract, imprecise categories of things, or pure abstrac-
tions such as "reasonable,"'' 94 "professional,"' 95 "administrative,"'' 96 "substantial evi-
dence,"' 97 or "use.' ' 98 So much for words themselves and their complexities, and really
we are only scratching the surface.
E. Complexities and Uncertainties from the Process of Reading
Before addressing some problems about the concept of "meaning" in both a general
and statutory context, it is probably a good idea to examine some insights from modem
psychology about the process of reading itself. Works on cognitive psychology and the
psychology of reading give us more complications to consider.
As we all know, reading is not just a matter of transfer of information from the print
to the reader's mind; there is also an active contribution from the reader's store of
knowledge. We bring our own experiences to bear on what is being read by filling
gaps, by interpretation, and by extrapolating from what is given in the text. 199
In statutory interpretation terms, Lawyer A brings one set of experiences to the
statutory language. Her adversary brings another. The judges bring their own. Because
we have a shared body of legal education and cultural experience, we usually can com-
municate, and sometimes even agree. But how do we explain "red" to someone who has
been blind since birth?
192. Justice Frankfurter intuited this quite well. "Unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a docu-
ment, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision." Felix Frankfurter,
Some Reflections, supra note 185, at 529.
193. For example, it is not too far-fetched to consider the situational ambiguity of wolf-dog hybrids under a
statute literally pertaining to dogs. Cf, People v. Hepburn, 180 Misc.2d 265 (N.Y. County Ct. 1999) (dismiss-
ing charge of possessing a wolf hybrid without a permit, but refusing to return the animal to its owner).
194. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (allowing recovery of "reasonable attorney's fee to be
paid by the defendant").
195. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (exempting employees who are employed in a bona
fide "executive, professional, or administrative capacity").
196. Id.
197. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (discussing statutory term, "substantial evi-
dence").
198. See infra Part V.B.3.
199. ROBERT G. CROWDER & RICHARD K. WAGNER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READING 131 (2d ed. 1992).
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There is no doubt that, when we read, we are attributing "meaning. '"20° "[M]uch
'meaning' is created by us in response to the material presented. In other words, we add,
we infer, we create. All this is a necessary part of the comprehension of natural lan-
guage.,, 20° As one basic text on cognitive psychology explains, "When people try to
form a coherent representation of the text they are reading, they often make inferences
that go beyond the information supplied by the writer.,
20 2
"As you might expect, people who have been instructed to read a passage carefully
are especially likely to draw inferences during reading. When reading slowly and care-
fully, we have the time to search for connections that we might otherwise miss., 20 3 Un-
fortunately, this also suggests that when we do the slow and careful reading necessary in
reading statutes, our tendency to draw inferences (from our own minds and our own
experiences) gets stronger. Again, we are not "finding" meaning in the statutory
words.2 ° 4 We are making inferences from our own minds and experiences. We can com-
plicate statutory interpretation, without even realizing it, by confusing the results of our
own mental processing of marks on the paper with some absolute "meaning" which we
insist those words "have. 20 5
What kinds of inferences are readers likely to make? Again, a basic introductory
text on cognitive psychology tells us that one study "examined four kinds of inferences
that people could draw when reading a story. Specifically, people can make inferences
about the goal, the plan, the action, or the state of characters in a story. 20 6 If people
tend to do that about a story, which almost by definition is written at a more concrete
level than abstract statutory language, just imagine what people (even judges and law-
yers) will do when reading statutory language, which is by its very nature expressed at a
high level of abstract generalization. Certainly, the established concept of attributing
"purposes ' 20 7 to a statute is closely related to our more general psychological tendency
to draw inferences about goals and plans when we read written materials.
We also tend to incorporate assumptions into our reading of language, including
statutory language. One introductory text on cognitive psychology refers to these as-
sumptions as "presuppositions. 2 8 Individuals shown a picture of an automobile acci-
dent with no shattered glass on the street are likely, when their recall is tested later, to
200. See supra Parts IlIl.A, III.F.
201. LYLE E. BOURNE, JR. ET AL., COGNITIVE PROCESSES 157 (1979) (discussing the ways in which we
"elaborate" on written words) [hereinafter COGNITIVE PROCESSES].
202. MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 289.
203. Id. at 290 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
204. See supra Parts II.B. 1, III.E-F.
205. Again, in light of contemporary knowledge about cognitive processes, it is quite likely that we cannot
limit ourselves to considering only statutory text. See supra Part ll.B. I.
206. MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 290 (emphasis added).
207. For just one example of cases mentioning "purpose" in statutory interpretation: "If the statute is am-
biguous, several principles guide the Court's interpretation. First, the statute must be read as a whole in a
manner that will promote its purposes." Rubick v. Sec. Instrument Corp., 766 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. 2000) (cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted).
208. COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 20 , at 159
20031
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remember shattered glass as part of the picture. This phenomenon probably occurs be-
cause we have seen automobile accidents with glass on the street.
2°9
This has more relevance to statutory interpretation than we might realize. For one
thing, statutory text is generally written at a fairly high (or very high) level of generali-
zation. 210 Hence, our "reading" of statutory language to some extent will be infected by
our natural tendency to elaborate and, sometimes erroneously, fill in "gaps" inherent in
the generalized language of statutes.2t l More complexities and sources of uncertainty
arise when the lawyers' and the judges' presuppositions are different.
For another thing, and more importantly, when we are applying statutory provisions
to real cases and thus drawing inferences from written text, we are engaged in a form of
mental processing. We are not following legal "rules." Drawing inferences from text,
including statutory text, is a matter of mental processing which involves presupposi-
tions, background knowledge, and decision making. This mental processing is not a
matter of artificial substantive rules having the force and effect of law, and probably
cannot be controlled by such rules.2 12 Statutory interpretation is a process of the mind,
not the application of a yardstick.
F. Complexities from the Concept of "Meaning" Generally
The very concept of "meaning" poses serious complications and sources of uncer-
tainty for statutory interpretation. More than fifty years ago, Professor Chaffee noted
that there were at least sixteen different definitions of the word "meaning."2 13 "[T]his
word 'meaning' which we lawyers and judges use so blithely as if it were a clear path
out of our tangles, is really a network of paths in which we are likely to get worse lost
than ever.''1 4 More recently, Professor Greenawalt has written, "In everyday life, people
talk without difficulty about what someone or something means. Yet, when we pause to
209. PLOUS, supra note 163, at 33; COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 201 at 156-158. This phenomenon
probably is related to general schema theories and the ways in which our general background knowledge
sometimes misleads us. MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 245.
210. See supra Part III.D.
211. MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 245 (discussing studies in which "background knowledge
misleads people and they recall inferences that were not actually stated.").
212. See infra Part V.B.8. However, one recent theorist seems to prescribe an approach which is tanta-
mount to requiring an arbitrary selection of "rules" to govern the reading of statutes. See Vermeule, supra note
59, at 74 (arguing for a normative theory, apparently based on law and economics jargon coupled with aspects
of decision-theory, and suggesting that-at least with respect to three areas-"judges should embrace a for-
malist approach to statutory interpretation, one that uses a minimalist set of cheap and inflexible interpretive
sources"); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 2086-90 (suggesting that many problems of statutory interpre-
tation could be solved in federal courts if Congress were to enact more detailed rules to govern statutory inter-
pretation). For another writer who suggests that statutory interpretation needs to be placed under a regime of
normative rules, see W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 397 (1992).
213. Zechariah Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 386 (1941) (referring
to the concept of "meaning" examined in C. K. OGDEN & I. A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING (4th
ed. 1936)).
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ask seriously what is involved when we assign a meaning to something, puzzling ques-
tions confront us.,
215
Among other things, "meaning" depends on context. "To understand the meaning of
a language item, we must take context into account .... 26 Attribution of "meaning"
must be based on the totality of contexts.1 7 On that basic point, most legal academics
agree. For example, Judge Richard Posner has written, "Meaning depends on context as
well as on the semantic and other formal properties of sentences.
' 218
"Meaning" consists in how we use words to symbolize events and situations in the
world as we know it. "Meaning" is not a tangible quality that can be measured in the
same way as mass, height, color, weight, etc. "Meaning" is how we use the words which
are at issue. "Meaning is what emerges when linguistic and cultural understandings and
experiences are brought to bear on the text. ' '2 19 "Meaning is patterns in human
brains. 220 It is our own minds which we are relying on when we draw inferences about
what a statutory provision "means."
G. "Meaning" in Statutory Interpretation: Major Complications
1. The Special Meaning of "Meaning" in Real Cases
"Meaning," in the context of statutory interpretation, has special complexities and
sources of uncertainty. "Meaning" in statutory interpretation cases is not the abstract
"definition" of the individual words of a statutory provision, nor is "meaning" in a live
case a matter of abstract philosophical considerations. Nor is the "meaning" of a statu-
tory provision in a live controversy a matter of explicating or extricating different plau-
sible "meanings" from a poem, story, or novel. Statutory interpretation cases are not part
of an imagined universe. They are not a passive or academic exercise.
Moreover, when we read a statutory provision in the abstract, without a particular
case in mind, the "meaning" which we attribute to the words may change when we en-
counter the facts of a particular case. When statutory language goes to court, it is no
longer an abstraction. It becomes part of the judicial process of making a decision.22'
The "meaning" of statutory words is a matter of how they apply in the resolution of
a dispute between contending parties. What usually happens when a court "interprets" a
215. Kent Greenawalt, The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449,
1450 (1997).
216. COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 201, at 157.
217. HAYAKAWA, supra note 183, at 55.
218. POSNER, supra note 88, at 269; see also Sunstein, supra note 40, at 504 (stating that "language 'by
itself lacks meaning"').
219. POSNER, supra note 88, at 269.
220. Mark Turner, Design for a Theory of Meaning, in THE NATURE AND ONTOGENESIS OF MEANING 93
(W. Overton & D. Palermo eds., 1994).
221. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2, at 82-83 (hypothesizing that the actual methods of judicial statutory
interpretation are linked to judges' overall approach to judging); POPKIN, supra note 52, at 247-48 (discussing
a theory of "ordinary judging").
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statute is that the court attributes some correspondence between the statutory words and
items in the "real world," namely, a concrete set of facts described in the case. The
court concludes that certain concrete facts are inside or outside the range of possible
situations symbolized by the general statutory words.22
2. Inchoate, not Indeterminate
Incidentally, this simple point indicates how erroneous it is to be preoccupied
with-or even worry about-the "indeterminate" nature or aspects of statutory interpre-
tation.22 3 The "meaning" of a statutory provision in the context of a judicial decision is
not so much indeterminate as it is inchoate. The very word "decision" should give us a
clue. Implicit in the very concept of the word "decision" is that it (the judicial decision)
did not previously exist because it had not been made. It was inchoate.
Before the opinion was rendered, there was no authoritative "meaning" relative to
the fact pattern before the court. An appellate court rendering a precedential opinion
creates "meaning" by resolving competing "interpretations" into a precedential case. 24
Before the binding precedential opinion was rendered, there was uncertainty about some
aspect of the statutory "meaning." After the opinion is rendered, there is a court-
fashioned equivalent of a substantive rule.225 To take a simple example discussed later in
this article, consider the issue of whether a phrase such as "used a firearm" includes
bartering a firearm for drugs.226 A high court decision that "use" does include such an
exchange establishes the equivalent of a substantive rule under that statute: "used a
firearm" includes bartering a firearm for drugs. The court has taken a situation of uncer-
tainty227 and used the tools and concepts of statutory interpretation to explain, and fash-
ion, a new rule of law, operating under the aegis of the statute itself.
Judges, textualist or not, make inferences from text and context. Those inferences,
when made by the highest court in a jurisdiction, are about, and control, how the statu-
tory words will be used in future cases. They are not matters of "abstract" "meaning." In
222. "Statutory interpretation inevitably involves questions about line drawing: Was the injured plaintiff a
member of the class for whose benefit Congress enacted a particular piece of legislation?" Michael P. Kenny
& Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropria-
tion Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 141 (1995).
223. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 9, at 29. See also text ac-
companying supra note 9.
224. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 466 (1989) ("The process of statutory interpretation inevitably involves some
lawmaking, as well as law finding, component."). See also Fifty Years of Judicial Service, reprinted in 264
F.2d (2nd Cir. April 10, 1989) (special session before the Second Circuit to commemorate the judicial service
of Judge Learned Hand).
225. Some courts, in an outbreak of hubris, express this concept in terms such as, "In the ordinary case,
when this court interprets a statute, that interpretation becomes part of the statute as if it were written into the
law at the time of its enactment." Holcomb v. Sunderland, 894 P. 2d 457, 460 (Or. 1995) (citations omitted).
226. See infra Part V.B.3.
227. See infra Part III.G.
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a very real sense, the courts are constructing a substantive rule for the future, under that
statute.
3. "Meaning" in Statutory Interpretation: Interaction
"Meaning" is also, or therefore, a matter of interaction with facts and the judicial
mind in statutory interpretation cases. The question for decision in a statutory interpreta-
tion case is not really the "meaning" of the individual statutory words in the abstract. It
is whether the particular fact pattern of the case fits inside or outside the classes, catego-
ries, or prototypes228 represented by the statutory words. In statutory interpretation, the
complications and uncertainties are such that a tomato may be a vegetable, or it may be
a fruit, depending on the case and context.
229
H. Complexities from Statutory Words Symbolizing Purposes and Policies
In a very real sense, a statute is more than the text itself. This fact, and our failure to
realize it, injects further complications and uncertainties into statutory interpretation.
After all, words are just symbols. 230 Words have no particular sanctity, much less any
particular "meaning." This is not to say that they are completely malleable. It is to say
that generations of courts were correct when they recognized that the literal words of a
statute do not necessarily reflect the "meaning" of the statute.231
Even if they have been carefully drafted, statutory words are still nothing more than
symbols for policies which have been enacted, and symbols for what the implementers
and deciders (mainly agencies and courts) are supposed to do in certain abstractly de-
scribed situations. The statute is not just the words. It is the purposes and policies which
its words symbolize, and that are to be established and implemented through the attribu-
tion of "meaning" to the words of the statute. Statutory words themselves are nothing
228. See, e.g., MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 224; Solan, Learning Our Limits, supra note 97, at
237-38 and passim (discussing the use of contextualism and prototypes relative to textualism).
229. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1893) (discussing whether a tomato is a fruit or vegetable for
purpose of customs tariff statute).
230. See supra Part llI.A.
231. For example, the eminent Chancellor Kent wrote, "The real intention, when accurately ascertained,
will always prevail over the literal sense of terms." JAMES KENT, I COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 462
(1826) (Hein & Co, Historical Reprints). An example of a case which followed Chancellor Kent is Mayor of
the City of Jeffersonville v. Weems, 5 Ind. 547, 549-50 (1854) ("[lt is the duty of Courts to execute all laws
according to their true intent and meaning; that intent when collected from the whole and every part of a
statute must prevail, even over the literal import of terms, and control the strict letter of the law, when the
latter would lead to possible injustice and contradictions.") (citing I KENT'S COMMENTARIES 462). For a
United States Supreme Court case that recognizes that the literal words are not always equivalent to "mean-
ing," see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ("The decisions of this Court have repeatedly warned
against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute,
for 'literalness may strangle meaning."') (citations omitted).
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more than approximations of the things and concepts which the writer or drafter is trying
to symbolize.232 There was a time when judges realized this:
[W]ords ... do not constitute the statute, but are only the image of it, and the life of
the statute rests in the minds of the expositors of the words, that is, the makers of the
statutes. And if they are dispersed, so that their minds cannot be known, then those
who may approach nearest to their minds shall construe the words, and these are the
sages of the law whose talents are exercised in the study of such matters.
3
As a more recent writer has put it, "Text primacy ought not mean text fetishism, how-
ever, especially when the texts are normative, as they are with statutes. 234
Worship of text is misplaced. Words are a vehicle, a means to an end. Therefore,
statutes are just a vehicle, a means to an end. The words in statutes are symbols used to
achieve that end. Words are not an end in themselves-at least not in the law. Words are
tools, clumsy tools. 235 Words are approximations. 236 Therefore, it would seem to follow
that laws are approximations, reflecting goals and purposes which are to be achieved,
and not mechanical limits to be imposed by apparatchiks.
L Complexities and Uncertainties from the Variables
As if the complexities of reading and applying language (and statutory language)
were not enough, there is another set of complicating factors in statutory interpretation.
Countless variables are involved in attributing "meaning" to statutory language in live
cases. Every statute is different. Every fact pattern is different. The differences may be
slight, and may not affect the outcome in a particular case, but the differences are there.
They are real. They are potentially significant. As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, with only a slight exaggeration, "The variables render every problem of
statutory construction unique. 237
To develop this notion a bit further, the meaning of words depends on context,
238
but the context of every statutory provision is different. No two statutory contexts are
exactly the same. Obviously, different statutes involve different subjects. Different stat-
utes will have different contexts, in terms of the statutory context in which each appears,
232. See supra Part III.C-D.
233. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 52, at 12 (quoting Partridge v. Strange & Croker, 75 Eng.
Rep. 123, 130 (K.B. 1553)).
234. Eskridge, supra note 107, at 1557.
235. Frankfurter, supra note 185, at 546.
236. "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (discussing wording of anti-noise ordinance in first
amendment case).
237. United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
238. See supra Parts I1l.F-G; see also, DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 271 (1975) ("One basic, well estab-
lished principle of communication is that meaning is carried not only by express words but also by the factual
implications that arise from particular context.").
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and in terms of the circumstances of each enactment. In cases involving the same stat-
ute, the facts almost invariably will be different from those of the leading precedential
cases. If they are not, the case should not reach the highest court of the jurisdiction.
J. Conclusions Regarding the Complexities and Sources of Uncertainty
This is not the whole picture, and these are not the only difficulties and complica-
tions involved in dealing with statutes.239 But the long and short of the matter is that the
ways in which we process the written word, and the special problems of processing the
statutory word when we are making decisions about cases in the real world, involve
some of the most complex mental operations that ordinary human beings are called upon
to perform.
It is difficult to improve on the following summary:
Ultimately, all communication is translation; ultimately, all listeners and readers are
imperfectly recoding speech or text into their own personal language. Learned con-
ventions and generalized, recurrent contexts for the deployment of natural languages
desensitize us to the complexity of communication through language, especially
among those who "share" the same natural language. But confronted with Babel-
with the confusion of tongues-we cannot escape this engagement with the capacities
and limitations of human language.
240
Yet, decisions must be made. Lawyers must advise clients. Agencies must issue a rule or
order based on the "meaning" of statutory language. Courts must ascribe "meaning" to
the statutory language, with or without a theory. Professors must theorize, or at least try
to make sense out of the mess.
A worthwhile next phase may be to consider a possibility. Perhaps these tools and
concepts reflect the main coping mechanisms which we and the courts use in dealing
with the complexities of applying abstract statutory provisions to particular facts (real or
hypothetical).
IV. THE HEURISTIC NATURE OF CONVENTIONAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CONCEPTS AND TOOLS
To repeat, statutory interpretation is an extremely complex mental process. The
complications start with the very basics of written communication, involve unconscious
239. For example, many of the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation used by the courts seem to be
in conflict with each other, or at least in tension with each other. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the The-
ory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed. 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401-06 (1950); see also infra Part V.B.6.
240. Roderick A. Macdonald, Legal Bilingualism, 42 MCGILL L.J. 119, 123-24 (1999) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
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mental processing, and then multiply when we encounter the special province of statu-
tory communication, with its difficulties of applying generalizations to particular factual
cases and its countless variables. When confronted by this order of complexity, we are
unable to consciously process all of the factors involved.
A. Bounded Rationality
Our ability to deal with complexity and variables is limited, because the human
mind is limited. In more scientific circles, our limited mental capacities are sometimes
called "bounded rationality. ' '241 "Essentially, bounded rationality describes the observ-
able fact that decision makers fail to 'process information perfectly even if they wish to
do so, because human ability to calculate consequences, understand implications, and
make comparative judgments on complex alternatives is limited."' 242 A leading article in
the growing movement toward making better use of insights from modern psychology
has described "bounded rationality" as referring "to the obvious fact that human cogni-
tive abilities are not infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed
memories. ,
24 3
Still, our limited mental processing capacities do not necessarily mean that we are
irrational. "People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that peo-
ple sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum
of decision costs and error costs. To deal with limited memories we make lists. To deal
with limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb." 244
B. Introducing Heuristics and Biases
1. Heuristics
A term increasingly used to denote these "mental shortcuts and rules of thumb" is
"heuristics." As is usual with words, "heuristics" is not a monolithic term with a single
241. "Bounded rationality" is a term that has infiltrated the legal literature. It is summarized quite well in
the following note:
The term 'bounded rationality' encompasses the notion that human cognitive abilities are finite
and imperfect; it is a recognition that humans have limited knowledge and computational capac-
ity.... These limitations include the time, energy, and financial costs of searching for and proc-
essing information, as well as general imperfections in human processing ability. Studies show
that bounded rationality plays an especially significant role in cognition whenever actors assess
the probability of uncertain events or values.
Rena Mara Samole, Note, Access to Justice. The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Real Employees, Cognitive
Psychology and the Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 289, 302-03
(2000) (footnotes omitted).
242. Id. at 302 (quoting Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995)).
243. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477
(1998).
244. Id.
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meaning. 245 However, current usage of the term "heuristics" has been influenced and
shaped over the past several decades by important work in fields such as cognitive psy-
chology and decision theory.246 "Heuristics" in this sense has become a fairly common
term in legal academia, where a growing body of work is influenced by, or seeks to
apply, the insights drawn from these fields.24 7 As used in much of the legal literature
today, "[heuristics refers to] a rule of thumb, simplification or educated guess that re-
duces or limits the search for solutions in domains that are difficult and/or poorly un-
derstood.,248 Heuristics are "cognitive simplifying strategies used to reduce the com-
plexity of information that must be considered in making a decision. 24 9
A very helpful discussion explains heuristics in terms of playing chess, pointing out
that heuristics refers to:
[A] strategy, usually a simplifying strategy, which provides aid and guidance in solv-
ing a problem. A heuristic is the opposite of an algorithm. In deciding what move to
make in a chess game, one could systematically consider and evaluate every possible
move. This would be an algorithmic strategy. Or one could evaluate only the posi-
tions of pieces in the center of the board and the most important pieces. That would
be a heuristic strategy.
250
The chess metaphor is highly appropriate here. The normal human mind, even in
chess, literally cannot proceed in completely algorithmic fashion, considering and
evaluating every possibility.25' In statutory interpretation, there are far more "pieces"
and possible "moves" than in chess. Statutory interpretation is not a closed game system
245. Among other things, "heuristics" is: (I) an ancient term; (2) a term used by the mathematician, G.
Polya; and (3) a term which has taken on some psychological connotations in the past few decades. For a more
learned disquisition on heuristics stretching back to the ancient Greeks and coming forward to the modem
mathematician Polya, see John W. Cooley, Descartes' Analytic Method and the Art of Geometric Imagineer-
ing in Negotiation and Mediation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 83, 111-113 (1993) (relating some of Descartes' meth-
odologies to Polya's "heuristic."). Polya's heuristics especially could warrant further study in this context
because they have certain features which could be very relevant to statutory interpretation. See generally G.
POLYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT (2d ed., 1985). However, limits of time and space require deferring such inquiry to
another time and another article.
246. The single most influential text in this area is JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162. A
more recent and introductory work is PLous, supra note 163.
247. See supra Part II.B.4.
248. Christopher T. Furlow, Erogenous Zoning on the Cyber-Frontier, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, II n.35
(2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
249. David B. Hennes, Comment, Manufacturing Evidence for Trial: The Prejudicial Implications of
Videotaped Crime Scene Reenactments, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2164 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
250. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuris-
tics, 15 LAW & SOC'y REV. 123, 131 n. II (1980-81).
251. For an interesting discussion of the importance among chess masters of patterns of the pieces on
chessboards and previous knowledge of many classic chess matches, see Adams & Farber, supra note 172, at
1286. ("[Wlhen chess pieces were randomly placed on the board, the chess masters did little better than the
novices. Moreover, when recalling real chess positions, chess masters did not place the pieces on the board on
an individual basis but in clusters of strategically meaningful groups .... In short, the experts "chunk" the
information into meaningful units--they recognize patterns and associate those patterns with potential strate-
gies.").
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with finite rules. We cannot expect the human mind to be more than heuristic when
deciding how to apply a statute to facts in live and messy cases, a task which involves
much more complexity than a game with several kinds of pieces, sixty-four squares, and
some true "rules" governing the movement of the pieces.
Generally, the relevant law journal articles accurately convey the essential concept
of heuristics, as that term has been developing over the past few decades in the cognitive
disciplines. Certainly they seem consistent with one of the most accessible explanations
of heuristics for non-psychologists:
When people are faced with a complicated judgment or decision, they often simplify
the task by relying on heuristics, or general rules of thumb. In many cases, these
shortcuts yield very close approximations to the 'optimal' answers suggested by nor-
mative theories. In certain situations, though, heuristics lead to predictable biases and
inconsistencies.
252
2. Biases and Errors
Unfortunately, biases and errors are inseparable from heuristics. To use imprecise
"rules of thumb" in making decisions under conditions of complexity and uncertainty is
to invite biases and errors stemming from the decision makers' own psychological
backgrounds and tendencies. In fact, the "literature" on heuristics understandably em-
phasizes the biases and errors more than the basic "heuristics" themselves.253
3. A Detour and Caveat
Before going further, however, it is necessary to interrupt this discussion of heuris-
tics and biases from the cognitive disciplines with a very important disclaimer about the
present article. As will be discussed below,254 a major point of this article is that statu-
tory interpretation has developed its own heuristics, in the form of the traditional con-
cepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
5
This article maintains, in other words, that the traditional concepts and tools of
statutory interpretation are heuristics, or at least heuristic in nature. The courts, more or
less intuitively, have developed (and continue to develop) these heuristics to deal with
the complexities and uncertainties of statutory interpretation. Furthermore: (1) these
statutory interpretation heuristics have associated with them biases and sources of error,
which in turn generate other statutory heuristics;256 and (2) some of these biases and
252. PLOUS, supra note 163, at 105 (emphasis added).
253. Indeed, the complete title of the seminal work on this topic is contained the term "Biases." See
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162.
254. See infra Parts IV.C, V.A-B.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. See infra Part V.B.2-4.
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sources of error are unique, while others are closely related to biases and sources of
error identified in the cognitive psychology and decision making literature.
257
Still, in order to understand better the significance of realizing that the tools and
concepts of statutory interpretation are heuristic in nature, or akin to heuristics, we need
to consider at least one example of a heuristic from modem-day studies of heuristics and
biases. One of the more relevant of these heuristics is "representativeness."
4. Representativeness
An important heuristic from modem psychology is the "representativeness heuris-
tic. '258 It denotes decision making based on the similarities between one situation and
another. One of the most succinct descriptions of this heuristic is "reliance upon stereo-
typical characterizations to the point of insensitivity to relevant prior probabilities and
sample sizes. ' '259
This heuristic should sound familiar to lawyers and legal academics, because we
have been brain-washed since law school on the fine art of reasoning (and misleading)
by analogies, a device rooted in similarities and differences. 260 Like most of the heuris-
tics identified by modem psychological research, "representativeness" is a natural and
valuable mental device for dealing with complex problems.26' We run our lives on simi-
larities. Common sense tells us that a person who displays certain symptoms of a par-
ticular disease may have some form of that disease. The brake lights of the cars in front
of us start turning red. On the basis of similar situations, we assume they are stopping
and we hit our own brakes. Students with high LSAT scores and high grade point aver-
ages from reputable universities are similar to students who have been successful in law
school, so we admit them to our law school.262 Again, this is all a matter of common
sense and common experience, but a matter which now has been subjected to some sci-
entific study which helps us better understand the representativeness heuristic, and even
more importantly, the biases and dangers of using it.
2 63
The representativeness heuristic, then, is about similarities, and very sound deci-
sions can be based on similarities. In law, as we already know, the value of the similari-
ties underlying an analogy can be very persuasive, depending on the relevance, quality,
and quantity of those similarities. 64
257. See infra Parts IV.B.4 (representativeness), V.B.2.b (egocentric and related biases).
258. For a general discussion of the representativeness heuristic, see PLOUS, supra note 163, at 109-20.
259. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the
Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 249 (1991).
260. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 93-102
(3d ed. 1997) (discussing analogies).
261. See generally PLOUS, supra note 163, at 109.
262. For one article (but not the only article) which discusses "representativeness" in this context, see
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1251, 1295 (1998).
263. See generally PLOUS, supra note 163.
264. For a discussion of analogies, see ALDISERT, supra note 260, at 93-102.
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Moreover, when we take a broader view, we realize that the representativeness heu-
ristic is very relevant to dealing with statutes. Most statutes reflect generic similarities
synthesized by abstract categories and classes.265 From the relatively primitive crimi-
nalization of murder and robbery, to the more sophisticated regulatory regimes of envi-
ronmental law, statutes exemplify "representativeness." Thus, certain killings with simi-
lar features, such as self-defense, are permissible. Degrees of murder and manslaughter
are based on "representative" similarities within the same degree or category of behav-
ior.266 Regulatory violations may involve generically similar prohibited conduct. Unfair
labor practices 267 and unfair employment practices 268 readily come to mind.
Indeed, "representativeness" is central to statutes. The very concept of categories
and generalizations, which are necessary to having statutes as we conceive them today,
requires that we be able to recognize certain similarities among individual instances. As
Hayakawa and his kindred tried to tell us, we cannot "think" or discuss anything in ab-
stract fashion without the ability to discern similarities and form categories. 269 But with
this ability, and the resulting heuristic of "representativeness," there come biases and
risks of error. An example from the pioneers Kahneman and Tversky is a good place to
start. Their example concerns "Steve," and certain experimental subjects who were to
guess Steve's occupation from the following description: "Steve is very shy and with-
drawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people or in the world of reality. A
meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail. 27 ° If
we were required to guess his vocation from a list of possibilities--e.g., pilot, salesman,
farmer, steel worker, or librarian-we would likely guess that Steve is a librarian. After
all, he has the stereotyped characteristics of a librarian. Yet what if there are only two or
three librarians in a particular rural demographic area and hundreds of farmers? Al-
though the statistical population indicates that there is a very low probability that Steve
is a librarian, many people will persistently conclude that someone like "Steve" is most
likely a librarian.27' Statistically, he is more likely to be a shy farmer.272 An article re-
garding securities regulation states:
[T]he representativeness heuristic ... causes people to tend to judge probabilities by
flouting numerous rules of statistics and to focus instead upon the degree of similarity
265. See supra Part III.C-D.
266. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2002) (setting out what constitutes first degree and second degree murder).
267. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
268. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(l).
269. HAYAKAWA, supra note 183, at 156-57.
270. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 4.
27 1. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973).
272. Id.; see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 4-11; PLoUS, supra note 163,
at 110-16.
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that an item seems to bear to a category or parent population.... The representative-
ness heuristic plays a large role in investing, leading investors to see patterns in truly
random sequences ....273
To use a more familiar term, a major bias or source of error in using the "representative-
ness" heuristic is stereotyping.274 This bias or risk of error can be found in the
implementation of law generally and is associated with statutory interpretation heuristics
as well as in statutes themselves.
27 5
C. Statutory Heuristics
The list of heuristics, biases, biases without heuristics, and insights from modem
psychological research can be spun out at length,276 but further discussion on this would
not be fruitful here. Although some of the biases investigated by cognitive research may
be the same or similar to biases in statutory interpretation, 7 the heuristics of statutory
interpretation are different from those identified by general cognitive research.
The most important difference (apart from being based on relatively controlled sci-
entific or empirical studies) is that the cognitive behavior heuristics have been identified
in the study of "decisions based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events
such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the
dollar.' '278 In the framework of the cognitive field, heuristics are mentioned in a number
of settings, such as: the future value of a stock,2 79 the risk of a heart attack, 280 and clini-
273. Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation: Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals
for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1470 (2002) (citations and footnotes omitted).
274. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Stan-
dards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. I115, 1140-41 (1987) ("In a study of the representativeness heuristic,
the subjects gave virtually the same probability that a stereotypically described man was a lawyer [regardless
of other factors]."); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 403 (1999) ("The first heuristic is 'representativeness'--the common human tendency to reason by
anecdote and stereotype rather than through the use of group-based knowledge.").
275. For an excellent article discussing stereotyping in the context of statutory interpretation cases under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Jane Byeff Kom, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001). For an example of a case, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (involving
denial of health insurance benefits for pregnancy). Commentary on this case has been extensive, but one of the
most quotable L, -Revealing a telling blindness, the Supreme Court's answer ... defined the relevant groups
to compare in a way that severed the connection between gender and pregnancy." Katharine T. Bartlett, Femi-
nist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 841 (1990) (discussing responses to what the author describes as
"the woman question," i.e., "examining the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise
appear to be neutral or objective." Id. at 837). For a discussion of Geguldig itself, see Diane L. Zimmerman,
Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 441 (1975).
276. For a general discussion of various heuristics, see PLOUS, supra note 163, at 107-88.
277. This article discusses some of the standard "biases" that may infect the "plain meaning" or "textual"
heuristic infra Part V.B.2.b.
278. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 3.
279. Id. at 8.
280. Id. at II.
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cal diagnoses. 28' These topics are different from judicial statutory interpretation. They
often, or typically, involve the prediction of events over which the participants have
little or no control.
The heuristics of statutory interpretation operate in a different field. The outcomes
relevant to statutory interpretation are very much under the control of human beings-
the judges. Judicial orders and opinions resolve the disputed application of statutory
language to a particular set of facts. The judges make the event-the particular applica-
tion of statutory law to facts-happen. 28 2 Again, the situations we confront in certain
statutory interpretation cases are inchoate,283 and to that degree uncertain, but they are
categorically different from situations studied by folks like Kahneman, Slovic and Tver-
sky. United States Supreme Court Justices cannot predict or order the future perform-
ance of a stock or the occurrence of a particular person's heart attack. They can, how-
ever, decide the "meaning" of a provision of statutory language in a particular case. And
they operate under conditions of uncertainty, whether they admit it or not.284
The concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are a different kind of heuristic
from those which have been identified and studied in fields related to cognitive behav-
ior. They are nevertheless heuristics and they carry with them their own set of biases and
problems, in addition to general biases and problems. Thus, the work from cognitive
psychology and decision theory remains highly relevant, both in a general sense and
perhaps specifically with regard to biases.285 The differences simply mean that we can-
not mindlessly or mechanically transfer the heuristics which the cognitive scientists
have pioneered into the domain of statutory interpretation.
The point here is, in a sense, larger and more ambitious. The traditional tools and
concepts of statutory construction are themselves heuristics, or at the very least akin to
heuristics. Interpreting and applying statutes is extremely complex and involves an inor-
dinate number and variety of variables.286 Every statutory provision is unique in some
way, and every fact-pattern worth litigating is unique in some way. Judicial decisions
involving statutory interpretation are often complex and made under conditions of un-
certainty. 287 This is precisely the situation that causes the human mind to resort to heu-
ristics. 2
88
281. Id. at 13.
282. Of course, from the perspective of the lawyer, statutory interpretation heuristics is about prediction.
The lawyer is trying to predict how the courts will interpret a particular statutory provision or to influence a
court to interpret a particular statutory provision in his or her favor.
283. See supra Part III.G.2.
284. Sometimes the Supreme Court does admit it. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 36 (1982)
("While the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that the 'treaty' exception contained in § 106 extends
to executive agreements.").
285. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
286. "The variables render every problem of statutory construction unique." United States v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952) (citation omitted).
287. See supra Part 111.
288. For whatever it is worth, it must be conceded that, in a sense, there is nothing new in recognizing the
heuristic nature of the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. It is just that the courts have not called
them "heuristics." The courts have, however, occasionally expressly referred to them as "tools," (Chevron
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There are a number of consequences in realizing that the traditional concepts and
tools of statutory interpretation are heuristics. Some of these consequences will be dis-
cussed, but not developed to the extent warranted by their importance, in Part V. More
extensive discussion awaits future articles.289
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING HEURISTIC
A. Summary of Benefits of Recognizing the Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
Concepts & Tools
At least two significant consequences or benefits flow from recognizing that the
tools and concepts of statutory interpretation are heuristics which come with an inextri-
cable assortment of biases and sources of error. First, the heuristic nature of the tradi-
tional concepts and tools of statutory interpretation offers plausible explanations for
many aspects, and much of the messiness, of statutory interpretation. For example, as
discussed below, it accounts for the widespread judicial use of those concepts and tools,
and their durability over at least the past 200 years. 290 As discussed below, 29' several
puzzling, and messy, aspects of statutory interpretation become more understandable
once we realize that the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are heuristic in
nature, and that biases and sources of error probably are inevitable in a heuristic regime.
Furthermore, and still with regard to the first benefit, realizing that the concepts and
tools of statutory interpretation are heuristic in nature not only explains a major source
of confusion in statutory interpretation but also prevents us from perpetuating some
serious mistakes. Specifically, it would keep us from the morass created by confusing
statutory interpretation concepts and tools with substantive rules having the force and
effect of law. The statutory heuristics are mental tools, not substantive rules. No small
part of the present judicial and academic confusion about statutory interpretation is
caused by this basic misunderstanding.
292
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)), or "rules of thumb" (Conn. Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (stating, even in the Supreme Court's New Textualist era, "In any
event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of
legislation ...."). But the courts often turn around, as in the Germain case itself, and immediately confuse
matters by sounding like they do conceive of these "rules of thumb" as hard and fast rules, to-wit: "[lI]n inter-
preting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there." Id. at 253-54.
As discussed infra Part V.B.8, a major source of confusion in statutory interpretation is the tendency
to slide into referring to statutory interpretation concepts and tools as "rules" with a connotation that they have
the force and effect of law. This source of confusion could be dispelled if the heuristic nature of statutory
interpretation concepts and tools were recognized and firmly implanted into the judicial and academic con-
sciousness.
289. See infra Part V.C.
290. See infra Part V.B. I.
291. See infra Part V.B.2-9.
292. See infra Part V.B.8.
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Second, realizing that the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are heuris-
tics with the associated biases and sources of error provides a better foundation on
which to build and study statutory interpretation. Each of these benefits and conse-
quences will be addressed below, although they will be discussed much more briefly
than they deserve.
B. Explanatory Force
1. Prevalence and Durability
Once we understand that the traditional concepts and tools of statutory interpreta-
tion are heuristics, or heuristic in nature, it is hardly surprising to realize that they are so
pervasive and durable. Being heuristic in nature, they reflect important aspects of the
ways in which human minds work when processing written text. They are a natural phe-
nomenon, reinforced by experience dealing with statutory language. They change very
slowly, if at all. To the extent that they change, their evolution is unlike substantive
common law rules of law, which are under severe pressures to change as society
changes. Statutory heuristics are reflections of natural and fairly stable mental processes
interacting with the collective experience of many judges over many generations of
working with statutes. Heuristics are similar to proverbs, many of which have been es-
sentially unchanged for millennia.293 Like proverbs, they grow from human insights and
have endurance because they reflect worthwhile, but not necessarily consistent,294
strategies for coping with complex problems and making decisions. Like the kinds of
heuristics identified in the cognitive disciplines, our statutory interpretation heuristics
have been around a long time, but they have never been studied systematically.
2. The Explanatory Force of Viewing Plain Meaning (or Textualism) and Intent as
Heuristics, and Some Biases
a. The Textual Heuristic
A lot of the messiness and confusion about "plain meaning' 295 and even "textual-
ism" becomes more understandable after we realize that those two labels actually reflect
293. See generally G. Polya, supra note 245, at 221-25. Among other things, Polya suggests that:
[T]here are a good many proverbs which characterize strikingly the typical procedures followed
in solving problems, the common sense involved, the usual tricks, and the usual errors . ...
[Miany a proverb can be matched with another proverb giving exactly opposite advice, and there
is a great latitude of interpretation. It would be foolish to regard proverbs as an authoritative
source of universally applicable wisdom, but it would be a pity to disregard the graphic descrip-
tion of heuristic procedures provided by proverbs.
Id. at 222.
294. For example, "absence makes the heart grow fonder," versus "out of sight, out of mind."
295. See supra Part II.A. I.
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a basic heuristic of statutory interpretation. For the sake of simplicity, we can retain
some of the conventional terminology and refer to this heuristic as a "textual" heuristic.
Although an exhaustive explication is beyond the scope of this article, the textual
heuristic, in brief, is a reader-centered strategy or rule of thumb for dealing with statu-
tory text. 296 In a manner very similar to modem textualism, 297 but without absolutes and
dogmas,298 the textual heuristic leads us to attribute a "meaning" which we objectively
think the bulk of informed readers would attribute to the relevant statutory words. The
textual heuristic is the most fundamental heuristic in statutory interpretation. It is the
most fundamental because there would be no point in having the ideas behind a statute
299reduced to writing if we then ignored the writing, or casually ignored the conventional
meanings of the words.
A textual heuristic is also a natural response to the complexities involved in proc-
essing statutory language and applying it to live cases. 300 Because of those complexities,
a textual heuristic is both natural and a good idea, if not carried to extremes. It would be
inefficient to quibble with every possible verbal nuance. After all, human language is
imperfect.3 ° 1 Reading is disambiguation. °2 The mental act of reading would be impossi-
ble if we perpetually looked for alternative meanings in everything we read.30 3 Unlike
fine literature, where disputes over the "meaning" of a passage or work cannot be defini-
tively resolved, the main point of judicially interpreting statutes is to definitively resolve
disputed meanings.
However, given the imperfections of language, and the level of generalization at
which most statutes are expressed, the more we study a passage of statutory language,
the more likely we are to find uncertainties and ambiguities. °4 It becomes important to
prevent nagging uncertainties, resulting from too much analysis-or a lawyer's advo-
cacy-from overwhelming us. A strong preference for reliance on reader-centered attri-
bution of meaning is natural, at least in situations where a particular inference about
296. See infra Part V.B.2.
297. See supra Part 11.B.2.
298. See supra Part II.A. L.a.
299. Chief Justice Marshall made this point in connection with the United States Constitution. See Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("To what purpose are powers limited, and to that purpose is
that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be re-
strained?").
300. See supra Part III.
301. See supra Parts III.B-G.
302. See supra Part III.A.
303. Again, the courts have intuited heuristically the biases, complications, and sources of error which can
result from reading too much into text. "It will always be true that the fertile legal 'imagination can conjure up
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of (disputed) terms will be in nice question."' Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 111 n. 15 (1972) (citation omitted). As another court said in connection with an insur-
ance policy case, "[Clounsel is indulging in the lawyer's favorite pastime of quibbling over the meaning of
words." Robert L. Berner Co. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 72 N.E.2d 727, 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) (responding to
attorney's argument that "spoiled" and "rotted" are not synonymous). "Where Congress has manifested its
intention, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that intent." Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333, 342 (1981) (citation omitted).
304. See supra Part III.A-F.
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"meaning" seems much more plausible than quibbling alternatives. Hence, the tradi-
tional "plain meaning" concept is so strong that courts may exaggerate and say that they
must stop, once they determine that the statutory language is plain or unambiguous.3 °5
Furthermore, in statutory interpretation, there may be strong reliance interests hing-
ing on the apparent "plain meaning" of a passage of statutory language. 30 6 There would
be a destabilizing effect throughout the legal system if apparently clear statutory text
were not accorded considerable authority. There are strong policy justifications then for
a correspondingly strong textual heuristic.
30 7
In sum, a textual heuristic-resolving a case by attributing a "meaning" that the de-
cision maker objectively thinks most informed readers would attribute to the relevant
statutory words-is a very effective and natural rule of thumb. If the "meaning" of a
statutory text, when context and language conventions are considered, seems on its face
applicable to the facts of the case, we may very well end there. We do this not as a mat-
ter of a substantive rule having the force and effect of law, but because it is in the nature
of our minds and validated by experience.
b. Some Biases of the Textual I :..Istic
However, we must always remember that reading still is nothing more than attribut-
ing "meaning" to marks on a page, tempered by the conventions of whatever "language
community" we belong to.30 8 With heuristics come biases. The textual heuristic is no
exception. In fact, there are several possibilities for biases and errors when using this
heuristic (and others). These biases and errors explain why we cannot rely solely on the
textual heuristic.
The first bias or distorting factor is directly related to the unconscious nature of our
mental processing. As previously discussed, when we read we attribute "meaning" in
our own minds to marks on a page. 309 Much of this attribution is the result of uncon-
scious mental activity.
3 10
The potential for biased reading should be obvious. Indeed, the biases here are di-
rectly related (and may be identical) to some biases identified and discussed in the litera-
ture related to cognitive functioning. Although there are probably different labels for
them, two of them have been referred to as "egocentric" and "overconfidence" biases.
31
'
305. See supra Part II.A. L.a.
306. See William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541,
595 (1988) ("[Tlhe text influences how people behave and departure from the plain meaning therefore disturbs
reliance interests.") (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1985) (securities); United
States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972) (tax)).
307. The biases and sources of error related to the plain meaning or textual heuristic counsel strongly
against treating it as an absolute preclusive rule. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
308. Two articles that discuss interpretive communities are: Blatt, Interpretive Communities, supra note 59,
at 629, 640-61; Schanck, supra note 182, at 835-39.
309. See supra Part III.E.
310. See supra Part III.A.
311. For a few articles that mention or address the egocentric bias, see Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and
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As one article has described it, the egocentric bias involves people's tendency "to
make judgments about themselves that are 'egocentric' . . . People routinely estimate,
for example, that they are above average in a variety of desirable characteristics, includ-
ing ... professional skills. ,,312 In what may be an understatement, the authors of that
article conclude that, "[1]ike litigants and lawyers, judges might also be inclined to in-
terpret information in self-serving or egocentric ways. Egocentric biases could lead
judges to believe that they are better decision makers than is really the case. '3 11
The link to the textualist heuristic should be obvious. A Justice may stubbornly at-
tribute his own "meaning" to a passage of statutory language-even being unconscious
about his stubbornness. He may sincerely believe that he merely is attributing the
"meaning" which a reasonable reader would attribute to the words. 314
"Overconfidence" is also a bias related to the textual heuristic. "People tend to be
overconfident in their judgments. Not only do individuals tend to overestimate how
much they already know, but they also tend to underestimate how much they have just
learned from facts presented in a particular context. 3 15
The seminal book edited by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, for example, contains
a paper which investigated clinical judgments by psychologists. 316 Although warning
Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2002) (discussing study implicating egocentric bias in settlement
bargaining); Joachim Krueger & Russell W. Clement, The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 596 (1994); Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 138 (1997) ("One of the most robust findings in the
literature on individual decisionmaking is that of the systematic tendency of many people to overrate their own
abilities, contributions, and talents. This egocentric bias readily takes the form of excessive optimism and
overconfidence, coupled with an inflated sense of ability to control events and risks."); Jennifer K. Robben-
nolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFFALO L. REV.
103, 147 (2002) ("[Jludges ... are vulnerable to cognitive illusions such as hindsight bias, anchoring, [and]
egocentric bias.") (footnotes omitted); Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977). For a telling
remark on the unconscious nature of this bias, see Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psy-
chological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 78 n.204 (1997) ("[N]on-sympathetic judgment may involve an
egocentric bias of which the decision-maker remains unaware.").
For articles mentioning or addressing the overconfidence bias, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 158,
at 1091; Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 103, 134 (asserting that "the most famous and allegedly best risk assessment ever performed
exhibited a sizeable over-confidence bias."); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding
Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1314 n.78 (1999) ("The overconfidence bias causes people to
place more confidence in their answers than they should.").
312. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 811-12 (2001). Another
illustrative description is that people "tend ... to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively
common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative responses as uncommon, deviant,
or inappropriate." Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1512, 1576 n.133 (1992) (quoting Ross et al., supra note 311, at 280).
313. Guthrie et al., supra note 312, at 813.
314. See supra Parts II.B.1, III.A.
315. Saks & Kidd, supra note 250, at 143 (footnote omitted). See also, Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics
and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 17-18
(1990) ("[A]ttribution theory teaches that, once a person adopts a stereotype, a wide variety of information
will be seen by that individual to reinforce that stereotype." (footnote omitted)).
316. Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
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against overgeneralizing from this study, the author concluded that the clinical psy-
chologists in the study overestimated their accuracy in assessing a clinical situation that
had been described to them.
Regardless of whether the task seemed strange or the case materials atypical, the
judges' confidence ratings show that they became convinced of their own increasing
understanding of the case. As they received more information, their confidence
soared. Furthermore, their certainty about their own decisions became entirely out of
proportion to the actual correctness of these decisions.
317
Judicial opinions expressing a judge's absolute confidence in his or her own con-
clusions about the "meaning" of a particular piece of statutory language may be an ex-
ample of this syndrome.
These are not the only biases and problems which can be associated with a textual
heuristic. Some of the biases and problems have names, such as "anchoring" 3 8 or
"confirmatory. 319 Others may not have a name, but the basic point is clear enough: each
reader brings a different background to a piece of writing. When dealing with statutes,
we must consider the possibility that one person's genuine "plain meaning" is somebody
else's genuine ambiguity-which brings us to the next section of this article.
supra note 162, at 287.
317. Id. at 292 (italics in original).
318. "Anchoring" involves the effects of a "first impression." Experiments have indicated that one's "first
impression" of a situation may bias one in favor of that first impression. For a general discussion of "anchor-
ing," see PLOUS, supra note 163, at 145-52. The relevance to statutory interpretation and the textual heuristic
should be evident. A judge's first impression of the "meaning" of statutory language (perhaps a first impres-
sion given by the judge's clerk or the judge's reading of a party's brief) may dominate the judge's subsequent
attribution of meaning to the statutory language at issue.
In the literature, anchoring often is discussed in conjunction with situations where the subjects of the
experiment take an initial position or are given false information to see if the initial position or false informa-
tion bias the conclusions which the subjects ultimately reach. The classic study involved appraisal of residen-
tial real estate, where some professional brokers were given information which included a bogus inflated
listing price. The "anchoring" bias caused by the inflated initial appraisal tilted those experts into a final ap-
praisal figure which was higher than the figure reached by those who had not been exposed to the inflated
initial figure. For a summary of this study, see Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in
Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1999).
Again, the relevance to statutory interpretation is "plain." Once a judge or Justice gets the idea that the
meaning is "plain," or that a passage of language "has" a particular "meaning," anchoring may close the
judge's mind. In sum, anchoring is another bias or distorting phenomenon that affects the way we process
statutory language. All of this may be nothing more than common sense, but it is common sense supported by
empirical studies and reputable scientists.
319. One article has summed up the "confirmatory" or "self-serving" bias: "[T]he term to describe the
observation that actors often interpret information in ways that serve their interests or preconceived notions."
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 158, at 1093 (emphasis added).
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3. Explanation of Disagreements about Whether the Language is Plain or Unclear
If "plain meaning" and its variants 320 are heuristic in nature, then we have an expla-
nation for one of the most confusing judicial tendencies in statutory interpretation cases.
Statutory heuristics explains the inexhaustible supply of cases in which both the major-
ity and the dissent(s) either: (1) disagree about whether a given statutory provision has a
"plain meaning;" or (2) agree the meaning of a statutory provision is "plain," but attrib-
ute different plain "meanings" to the words. 2' Heuristically, such disagreements arise
when different readers are using their own attributions of meaning. Even if they con-
sciously are trying to use a reader-centered textualist heuristic,322 these different readers
may attribute very different "meanings" to the same statutory text.
This helps explain cases such as one described by Justice Scalia in his essay on in-
terpretation.3 23 The case involved a felon who had traded an unloaded gun for some
drugs.324 The statutory provision at issue increased the punishment if the defendant
"used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 325 Justice Scalia cas-
tigated those of his brethren who failed to attribute the same meaning as he did to "use."
According to Justice Scalia,
The vote [against his reading of the text] was not even close (6-3) .... [A] proper
textualist, which is to say my kind of textualist, would surely have voted to acquit.
The phrase 'uses a gun' fairly connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used
for, that is, as a weapon.326
The textual heuristic and its associated biases help explain the situation described
by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia, using his textualist, reader-centered heuristic, empha-
320. See supra Part II.A. L.a.
321. Only a few examples will be set out here: "The plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act mandates a
negative answer to both of these questions." Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186, 253 (1996) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). "The majority succeeds in portraying the Act as 'unambiguous' by making light of its most
relevant provisions." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 637 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); "The majority simply asserts that the plain meaning of 'right to payment' is an 'enforceable obli-
gation,' which gives a restitution order the 'character' of a 'right to payment.' I cannot accept this easy conclu-
sion." Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 566 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); "I find
the statutory language plainly and unambiguously to preclude the construction given the EAJA [Equal Access
to Justice Act] by the majority." Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 897 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
For an example of one academic who recognizes this point, see Taylor, supra note 22, at 356 n. 162
(noting that conflict between Supreme Court majorities and dissents in 21 cases during the spring of the 1993
term "derived, at least in part, from disagreements over the plain meaning of the statute at issue"); see also
Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra, note 57, at 210 ("The dissenting opinion chastised the majority for
failing to follow the plain meaning of the statute. Oddly, the majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia;
the dissent was by Justice Souter.").
322. See supra Parts II.B.I, V.B.2.a.
323. SCALIA, supra note 3, at 23-24. The case was Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
324. SCALIA, supra note 3, at 23-24.
325. Id. at 24.
326. Id. (emphasis added).
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sizes the "meaning" which he himself attributed to the word.327 But his attribution is
only one of several possible meanings of "use." '328 "Use a gun" on its face is quite broad
and literally would include using a gun as a medium of exchange for drugs. It would
appear that Justice Scalia was "using" a prototype: 329 a perpetrator armed with a gun,
ready to shoot somebody. This is a narrower "meaning" of "use," and it is a respectable
interpretation. In fact, many of us might agree with Justice Scalia's attribution of mean-
ing in that case, but such agreement would not be grounds to sneer at those who dis-
agree.
A heuristics-based view of the tools and concepts of statutory interpretation helps
explain why, on such a pipsqueak case, the United States Supreme Court disagreed on
how to apply the statutory language. Because the textual (or "plain meaning") heuristic
is reader-centered, it is prone to a number of biases related to the individual reader's
experience and world-view. 330 "Using" a reader-centered, textual heuristic therefore
easily can lead to different "interpretations" of the same language. Nor can we predict
ahead of time, or have any "determinate" theory to achieve, the "correct" interpreta-
tion.331 The reader's own attribution of "meaning" is inherently fallible. 332 Being heuris-
tic means being fallible in our inevitably personal and subjective reading of anything
written by someone else. Being fallible means that other heuristics are needed, most
notably the heuristic commonly labeled "legislative intent."
4. The Intent Heuristic and Related Heuristics and Biases
Because reasonable people can disagree about "plain meaning" and because even
latter-day textualists admit that ambiguities and genuine uncertainties about meaning
exist,333 courts deploy another heuristic. They use, and have used for generations,334 an
"intent" heuristic. This "intent" heuristic is nothing more than a variation on an every-
day approach to ambiguities and uncertainties about the "meaning" of everyday utter-
ances. In everyday discourse we ask the other person for clarification: "What do you
327. Justice Scalia's position here seems strange in light of his criticism, in the same essay, of Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which the Court refused to be literal, in a fashion
reminiscent of Scalia's refusal to be literal about "use." SCALIA, supra note 3, at 18-20. "Well of course I think
that the act was within the letter of the statute, and was therefore within the statute: end of case." Id. at 20
(emphasis added).
328. Among the definitions of "use" found in a standard dictionary are "put into action or service . . .
employ ... exercise ... expend or consume by putting to use .... " WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2523-24 (1986).
329. For some discussions of prototypes, see MATLIN, COGNITION, supra note 172, at 224; Solan, Learning
Our Limits, supra note 97, at 237-38 and passim (discussing the use of contextualism and prototypes relative
to textualism).
330. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 312, at 780-81; Oskamp, supra note 316, at 287; Saks & Kidd,
supra note 250, at 143.
331. See supra Part III.G.2.
332. See supra Part III.A.
333. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 28 ("It is hard enough to provide a uniform, objective answer to the
question whether the statute, on balance, more reasonably means one thing than another.").
334. See supra Parts II.A. .b, II.A.2.
[Vol. 30:1
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation
mean? '335 Clarification can be elicited by a quizzical look or a simple "Huh?" "Intent,"
as noted earlier in connection with "intentionalism, ' '3 6 is a speaker-centered or writer-
centered heuristic.
When dealing with written text, and the writer is unavailable, or the text is the
product of a collective entity such as a legislature (or a disbanded committee337), we
confront a special set of problems. Unlike our everyday conversations, or written text
when the writer is available for clarification,338 we cannot go back to the disbanded leg-
islature to ask them what was intended.339 If we are unsure about the "meaning" of such
a text, then what do we do? We simply ask a variation on the question which we nor-
mally would ask in face-to-face conversations. We cannot directly ask a particular
document to tell us, "What did you intend?" So, we ask, "what did the person who wrote
this intend?" The nearly automatic, reflexive quality of this heuristic is exemplified by
our old friend Blackstone. Despite rejecting the notion that interpretive issues should be
referred back to the legislature, Blackstone still said, "The fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time
when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable." 340
"Legislative intent" thus is simply a variation on one of the important mental de-
vices we use when we are not certain about the meaning of an utterance. We try to fig-
ure out what the writer meant to say, or what the writer would have intended to happen
in a set of unforeseen circumstances.
5. Other Heuristics
Once we recognize the basic textual and intent heuristics in statutory interpretation,
others readily come to mind. For example, there are a number of "presumptions" about
335. If I am not sure what my wife means when she says something, I take a deep breath and say, "Sorry, I
didn't understand you." Or if I am really feeling brave, I may ask, "What do you mean?" This, of course, is not
foolproof, as anyone who has lived with someone else for a substantial period of time can tell you. See gener-
ally DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT!: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS
YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS (1986) (discussing problems of communication among individuals caused by
differences in communication style and differences between intended meaning and perceived meaning of
statements).
336. See supra Part II.B.2.
337. In some respects, each past "Congress" legalistically resembles a disbanded committee. The 95th
Congress, for example, no longer exists.
338. For an example familiar to law professors, we can get clarification from a student about what the
student meant in a murky passage in the student's seminar paper.
339. The conventional policy reason is found, for example, in BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 59 ("To
interrogate the legislature to decide particular disputes, is not only endless, but affords great room for partiality
and oppression."). For a few examples regarding the inadmissibility of legislator's testimony regarding inten-
tion or intended meaning, see Board of Trustees v. City of Little Rock, 750 S.W.2d 950 (Ark. 1988) (stating
that testimony of former state legislator with respect to his intent in introducing legislation was clearly inad-
missible); Claridge v. New Mexico State Racing Commission, 107 N.M. 632, 763 P.2d 66 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that state supreme court had rejected efforts to introduce affidavits from legislators regarding
interpretation of statutory provisions). See also SINGER, supra note 82, § 48:17.
340. BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 59 (emphasis added).
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legislatures and about how legislatures use words. These presumptions are heuristic. To
mention just one, there is a presumption against surplusage, even though statutes un-
doubtedly in fact do contain surplus words. However, courts have created a presumption
to the contrary. It is presumed that legislatures do not put surplus or unnecessary words
into a statute.34' Conceived as a heuristic about "intention" or the "intended meaning" of
words, it makes sense. If nothing else, a contrary presumption would be very disruptive.
If courts were to presume that legislatures routinely inserted surplusage or unnecessary
words, then we would be faced with the insurmountable task of discerning which words
were, and were not, to be ignored. If surplusage were presumed, a whole additional set
of heuristics would be necessary in order to identify when, how, and whether surplusage
had occurred, and how to attribute meaning in light of a presumption that legislatures
used surplus words. Therefore, we "presume" that legislatures do not use surplus words.
Of course, the intent heuristic and all other heuristics, have biases and sources of er-
ror. 34 2 But this is neither the time nor the place for further census of statutory heuris-
tics.
343
6. Explaining the [In]tolerable Conflict Among the Canons and Maxims: Homage to,
and a Raspberry for, Karl Llewellyn
The heuristic nature of statutory interpretation concepts and tools also helps explain
one of the major sources of confusion and messiness in statutory interpretation-the
apparent conflict among the various concepts and tools of statutory interpretation. 344 To
341. See, e.g., United States v. Yophes Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Platt v. Union
Pac. R. Co. 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) ("Congress is not to be presumed to have used words for no purpose."));
Carcamo-Flores v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 805 F.2d 60, 66 (2d. Cir. 1986) ("There is a pre-
sumption against construing a statute as containing superfluous or meaningless words or giving it a construc-
tion that would render it ineffective."); Grodis v. Burns, 459 A.2d 994, 997 (Conn. 1983) (referring to "our
presumption that every sentence, phrase, and clause of a statute has a purpose").
There are, of course, a slew of other presumptions which are heuristic in nature. For example, "Con-
gress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law." United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605
(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1083 (1996) (citations omitted). Then there is the presump-
tion that the legislature, when using different words in the same statute intended for those words to be given
different meanings. Iraola & Cia, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 858 (11 th Cir. 2000).
342. See supra Parts IV.B.2, V.B.2.b.
343. However, it is worth noting here that support for the existence of both a textual and "intent" heuristic
comes from today's "new textualism" itself. As discussed supra Part II.B. 1, "textualism" still uses most of the
traditional concepts and tools (heuristics) associated with "legislative intent"-for example, "common usage,"
the "whole statute," the canons (selective perhaps) of statutory interpretation, ad nauseam. Thus, the very
theory that proclaims most stoutly that it is a reader-centered approach to statutory interpretation, and whose
adherents sometime cast aspersions at the very term "intent," winds up using many of the concepts and tools
historically associated with discerning "legislative intention."
344. For two examples of authorities who recognize the contradictions and inconsistencies among the
tenets of statutory construction, see Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 305
(1990) (referring to the "whole raft of judicially-created canons of statutory construction-many of which
contradict each other-through which courts have traditionally viewed legislative pronouncements"), and
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
807 (1983) ("[T]wo inconsistent canons can usually be found for any specific question of statutory construc-
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understand the heuristic significance of this point, it is necessary to consider some back-
ground.
Back in 1950, Karl Llewellyn damaged the credibility of the traditional concepts
and tools of statutory interpretation in a semi-famous article.345 Referring to the concepts
and tools of statutory interpretation generically as "canons," he used the simple device
of putting 56 of them in two columns, with twenty-eight canons in each column.346 For
each canon in column one, he put in column two a canon which conflicted, or was in
tension, with the first.347 For some pairs, the canon in column one was not totally in
conflict with its opposite number, but was countered by a canon which was an exception
capable of swallowing up the first canon.348 For many years, his tactic of setting one
"canon" against its opposite (or an exception which could negate the "canon") was re-
garded as a devastating blow to the canons of construction.349 Yet courts continued to
use them.350 Then, with the surge of interest in statutory interpretation theories, Justice
Scalia35 1 and others 352 started challenging Llewellyn's tactic. Some tried simply to reha-
tion.").
345. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
346. Id. at 401-06.
347. For example, consider #20: "Expression of one thing excludes another;" versus, "The language may
fairly comprehend many different cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example." Id at
405. See also supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
348. For example, consider # 16. "Every word and clause must be given effect;" versus, "If inadvertently
inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute, they may be rejected as surplusage." Id. at 404.
349. For an example of the conventional wisdom, "Over forty years ago . . . Professor Karl Llewellyn
wrote a devastating critique of the canons of statutory construction. For virtually every canon of construction,
he demonstrated that there was another canon that could be employed to reach the opposite result. His point
was not to be critical, but to argue proscriptively that the process of statutory construction requires an interpre-
tation in light of a judicial determination of 'some assumed purpose."' Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You
Gone, Karl Lllewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1992)
(footnotes omitted).
One writer refers to the same list, "the Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn offered a devastating critique of
the idea that judges could decide cases simply by following precedent. In this appendix Llewellyn presented a
comprehensive set of canons of statutory interpretation drawn from case law. His brilliant contribution was to
show how these could be arranged in matched contradictory pairs, thrust-parry. For every maxim of statutory
interpretation available to judges from somewhere in the prior case law, it turned out that there was another
maxim also extracted from some place in the case law that would lead them to exactly the opposite conclu-
sion." Robert J. Steinfeld, Book Review: Gary Minda, Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology
Shape the Legal Mind, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 437, 437-38 (2002).
350. As one writer described it:
How can one explain the puzzling persistence of maxims of statutory interpretation? Their in-
tellectual justification was long ago considered demolished by Karl Llewellyn's devastating cri-
tique, in which he demonstrated--or appeared to demonstrate-that for every maxim there is an
equal and opposite counter-maxim, thus casting maxims into a slough of indeterminacy. [Present
author's insertion: Footnote 2 of the cited article states, in pertinent part, "Maxims, after Lle-
wellyn's work, were considered by most legal academics to be mere conclusory explanations ap-
pended after the fact to justify results reached on other grounds."] .... Judges have continued to
cite the maxims of statutory interpretation in deciding cases. Indeed, they have continued to
speak as if the maxims have real bite in determining outcomes."
Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179, 1179-80 (footnotes
omitted).
351. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 26.
2003]
Journal of Legislation
bilitate the "canons. 353 However, at least one writer has condemned Llewellyn's cri-
tique and impliedly, Llewellyn himself.354 Notwithstanding these counterattacks, a sim-
ple fact remains. The canons are in tension with each other and can be deployed against
each other. This is a major source of messiness in statutory interpretation, apparently
contributing to inconsistent and unpredictable results among the cases.355
However, has anyone asked why so many of the "canons" behave this way, or to be
more precise, why they can be arranged in opposition (or tension) with each other, and
yet still survive? WHY haven't some become extinct in Social Darwinian fashion? How
can these "conflicting" maxims have managed to coexist for so long?
If the tools and concepts of statutory construction are heuristics, then a lot of these
conflicts and tensions, and the failure of courts to resolve these conflicts and tensions,
are explained quite simply. Different heuristics are no more in conflict than different
tools are in conflict. A hammer does not conflict with a wrench. They are just used dif-
ferently, in different contexts.
352. One article criticizing Llewellyn's tactic is Sunstein, supra note 40, at 452 ("In fact, however, his
claim of indeterminacy and mutual contradiction was greatly overstated; some of the canons actually influ-
enced judicial behavior insofar as they reflected background norms that helped to give meaning to statutory
words or to resolve hard cases.").
353. As characterized by one article, "More recent scholarship, however, has suggested that Llewellyn
overstated his case, giving insufficient consideration to the judiciary's capacity to make sense of canons in
context." John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 96 n.370 (2001)
(citations omitted). Another criticism states, "By the thrust-and-parry display of individual canons and
counter-canons, Llewellyn deflected attention from the most likely value of canons-to work together as an
interpretive regime, yielding more consistent results than would exist in its absence." Eskridge, Formalism,
supra note 59, at 679.
354. "But if one examines [Llewellyn's] list, it becomes apparent that there really are not two opposite
canons on "almost every point"-unless one enshrines as a canon whatever vapid point has ever been made by
a willful, law-bending judge." SCALIA, supra note 3, at 26. Justice Scalia further scolds Llewellyn by, among
other things, saying, "There are a number of other faux canons in Llewellyn's list . I..." Id. at 27. "Mostly,
however, Llewellyn's "Parries" do not contradict the corresponding canon but rather merely show that it is not
absolute." Id. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia actually is supporting the contention of this article that the
concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are heuristics. As he says, "Every canon is simply one indication
of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications (perhaps supported by other canons), it must yield." Id.
(italics in original). The canons, he seems to admit, are not rules, but merely indications of meaning. See infra
Part V.B.8.
355. See supra Part ILA; see also Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 2086-90 (suggesting that many problems of
statutory interpretation could be solved in federal courts if Congress were to enact more detailed rules to
govern statutory interpretation); Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 59, at 74 (2000) (arguing for a
normative theory, apparently based on law and economics jargon coupled with aspects of decision-theory,
that-at least with respect to three areas-"judges should embrace a formalist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, one that uses a minimalist set of cheap and inflexible interpretive sources."). Another writer seems to
recognize that the attribution of meaning at least involves factual elements but nevertheless insists that we
need "rules for interpreting legislation." W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statu-
tory Interpretation under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1992). These positions reflect a kind of
decadent positivism, under which everything in the law must be a "rule," formalism is paramount, and judicial
discretion (on the surface of things) is limited by "rules." As indicated earlier, this author's position is very
different. These so-called "rules" are not rules, at least not rules in the sense of substantive rules having the
force and effect of law. See infra Part V.B.8.
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As will be discussed shortly,356 if the tools and concepts of statutory interpretation
were "legal rules," in the traditional black-letter sense, the differences between them
would be true "conflicts," and therefore intolerable. If the concepts and tools of statutory
interpretation were substantive, algorithmic "if-then" rules having the force and effect of
law, they would have to be obeyed. Llewellyn would have been correct to point out the
folly of using "rules" which are inconsistent, in tension, or in conflict, to make deci-
sions.
But they are heuristics-tools, not "rules" in the sense of substantive rules having
the force and effect of law. Different strategies or tools can simultaneously exist for
dealing with a particular problem. One of the most basic examples in the repertoire of
human behavior is a set of two crucial possibilities when we are confronted with a
threat-"fight or flight.' '357 You cannot actually do both at the same moment because the
two strategies conflict. But nobody claims that one of them should be discarded entirely.
Are the explanatory and decisional tools which we use in statutory interpretation so
different?
We contain in our minds different mental tools and strategies for coping with the
problems attendant upon making decisions generally. We are full of conflicting maxims
and proverbs.358 Is there any reason why the same should not be true of the concepts and
tools that pervade statutory interpretation? These concepts and tools resemble mental
strategies and tactics more than they do artificial "rules" of law.
7. Explaining the Strengths and Persistence of Current Theories
The heuristic nature of the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation also helps
explain some of the fundamental strengths of many current theories, and why none have
achieved consensus. 359 Textualism reminds us that statutory text is the single most im-
portant day-to-day factor in attributing meaning to statutory language. Intentionalism,
dynamic theories, and theories of practical reason (or pragmatism) remind us that we
can't focus solely on "text." Even the textualists admit that.
3 6 0
Again, text itself is just marks on a page. 36' A statute is an idea (or assortment of
ideas) reduced to writing, and operative over time, as the dynamic theory and "practical
reason" theories remind us. 362 And if we start with the realization that two of the major
points of academic dispute (text and "intention") are "heuristics," percolating in a com-
356. See infra Part V.1.8.
357. "It is important to understand what actually happens to the body when the stress response is activated.
This is a kind of survival reflex, conserved in evolution because animals with a good fight-or-flight response
tend to survive moments of danger or emergency." Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping
Stress: The Science and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LIrLE ROCK L. REV. 9,
12(2001).
358. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Parts II.B, II.B.4.
360. See supra Part lI.B. 1.
361. See supra Part III.B-G.
362. See supra Part II.B.3.
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plex assortment of other collateral heuristics, then we can see, among other things, why
the conflicting theories have led to "impasse. ' '363 None of them describe the whole pic-
ture.
8. "Tools not Rules": Explaining a Major Source of Confusion
Much of the incoherence and messiness in statutory interpretation results from at-
tempts to treat, and conceive of, these heuristics as if they were substantive rules having
the force and effect of law. Realizing, once and for all, that the concepts and tools of
statutory interpretation are heuristics would both explain and eliminate this source of
confusion in statutory interpretation.
As already noted,364 the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are NOT
"rules ' 3 65 in the sense of being substantive rules having the force and effect of law. 366 If
the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation were substantive rules having the force
and effect of law, they would indeed be incoherent and make no sense. There is too
much conflict and tension among them to be "rules" which have fixed substantive con-
tent and hierarchy.367
But they are not rules in that sense. They are heuristics. They are ways of coping
with the complex enterprise of statutory interpretation. They are coping mechanisms
363. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 234; see also Kelso & Kelso, supra note 2,
at 81; supra Part lI.B.
364. See supra Part V.B.8.
365. Furthermore, jurisprudence and legal theories themselves are far from a consensus on the nature of
"rules" generally. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995) (discussing
the virtues and shortcomings of "rules"). "Whether a legal provision is a rule, a presumption, a principle, a
standard, a guideline, a set of factors - or something else - cannot be decided in the abstract. Everything de-
pends on the understandings and practices of the people who interpret the provision. Interpretive practices can
convert an apparently rule-like provision into something very unrule-like." Id. at 959-60. Accordingly, there is
a sense in which the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation could be called rules-if we include things
like "guidelines" within the class or category of rules. The point emphasized in the text above, however, is that
calling them "rules" generates a lot of the perceived messiness and incoherence of statutory interpretation. The
semantic pull of a term like "rules" causes us to misconceive the very nature of the standard concepts and tools
of statutory interpretation.
366. The phrase used in the text of the present article is "substantive rules having the force and effect of
law." This term is borrowed from administrative law. See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety and
Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1992) (stating that "substantive rules have the force and effect of law,"
(quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n. 3 (1947)). The
phrase is used in an attempt to capture the essential point that statutory interpretation heuristics are not "rules"
in the sense of imposing substantive requirements to use them, or to use them in any fixed way. The confusion
created by speaking of statutory interpretation heuristics as "rules" is similar to the confusion created in ad-
ministrative law by the distinction between "substantive rules" and other kinds of rules, namely "interpreta-
tive" rules and policy statements. 5 U.S.C. § 553. For some examples of cases conceding the confusion and
uncertainty in administrative law, see Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994)
(saying that the "distinction ... has proven to be one incapable of being drawn with much analytical preci-
sion"); Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 173 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("As we have
often recognized, it is quite difficult to draw a line between substantive and interpretative rules.") (citations
omitted).
367. See supra Part V.B.6.
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rooted in: (1) the ways our minds operate; (2) our cognitive limitations; and (3) the col-
lective experience of applying statutes to live factual situations.
One of the few academics of his era to systematically study statutory interpretation
recognized the essence, and importance, of this point. Although understandably he did
not use the term "heuristics," Professor Dickerson's words in 1975 are very cogent to-
day. He realized that many of the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation were not
substantive rules. He referred to some of them as "principles of communication." "Prin-
ciples of communication and specific tacit assumptions are matters of fact, not law...
,,368 Professor Dickerson discussed at some length the problems of any attempt to con-
vert these tools and concepts into statutory "rules" for interpreting statutes. 369 Referring
to the concepts and tools which take the form of "presumptions" (such as the presump-
tion against implied repeals), he wrote, "Being presumptions and presumably rebuttable,
they serve as innocuous reminders of some of the elements that the reader should keep
tentatively in mind.... Certainly they have no controlling force. '" 370
To treat the statutory interpretation heuristics as "rules," in the substantive sense, is
similar to treating a pig as if it were a horse. If we do that, then we start demanding from
a pig all sorts of characteristics that a pig just does not have. We start prescribing for our
theoretical pigs requirements that they behave certain ways-for example that they
physically can be ridden by human beings if properly trained and bridled. Likewise, we
start demanding (or pretending to demand) from statutory construction a determinacy 371
and limited range of judicial responses that are wholly inappropriate to the task of apply-
ing statutes to reality. The result, again, is confusion.
And confusion enough there already is. On some days, a court recognizes that the
concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are not substantive rules having the force
and effect of law.3 72 On other days, the same court speaks as though the concepts and
tools of statutory interpretation are rules in the substantive sense.373
Perhaps the most highly placed example of this confusion is found on the United
States Supreme Court itself. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas said:
368. DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 266 (discussing statutory interpretation acts).
369. Id. at 265-81.
370. Id. at 267 (emphasis added)
371. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
372. Perhaps the most notorious example of referring to statutory interpretation concepts as tools is foot-
note 9 of the Chevron opinion, which states that, "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and
must be given effect." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). See
also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 (1983) ("The rule of statutory construction invoked in Pennhurst
was, like all rules of statutory construction, a tool with which to divine the meaning of otherwise ambiguous
statutory intent.") (emphasis added).
373. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("If the statute is clear and unambiguous
'that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress."') (citations omitted).
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In any event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts
determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should al-
ways turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again
that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute wnat it says there.
3 74
Apparently, the good Justice was uttering for the Court a variation on the old "plain
meaning" concept. He conceded that this concept is among the "canons" of construction
and was no more than a "rule of thumb" (albeit a strong one). But then Brother Thomas
turned around and immediately elevated this "rule of thumb," in self-contradictory fash-
ion, into something indistinguishable from a substantive rule having preclusive effect.
Writing as though it were a rule in a hierarchical setting, Thomas went on to say, "When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial
inquiry is complete. 
375
By failing to realize that the "plain meaning" concept is not a substantive rule, Jus-
tice Thomas and a slew of other appellate court judges exaggerate the natural impor-
tance of text and create a "faux rule. 376 A steady realization that even the "plain mean-
ing" concept is a heuristic, albeit a strong heuristic, would prevent such confusion.
To show how easily this confusion leads to an outright debacle, consider the Fourth
Circuit's relatively embarrassing decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil.3 77 There, a staunch
majority, en banc, employed a primitive brand of textualism and insisted that the "mean-
ing" of "employee" plainly did not and textually could not include a former em-
ployee.378 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, although the author of the opinion-
Justice Thomas-apparently could not bring himself to depart from the faux rule pre-
tense that judicially perceived unambiguous "meaning" must end judicial inquiry. In-
stead, he declared-perhaps disingenuously-that the term "employee" was ambiguous,
because its usage in the particular statutory provision at issue did not have a "temporal
qualifier., 379 One writer has described Robinson, perhaps unfairly, in the following
terms: "In Robinson ambiguity becomes a magically liberating factor, a beautiful thing
for judges-even if, or one might say, especially if, it is selectively employed., 380 How-
ever, if we realize that statutory heuristics are not "rules" having the force and effect of
law, we can be less cynical and sarcastic. We can give text its due, but recognize that
biases and sources of error, stemming from the Justices' and judges' own mental proc-
essing, require rejection of any absolute, preclusive "rule" about "plain meaning."
374. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted).
375. Id. at 453 (citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981)).
376. No apologies whatsoever to Justice Scalia for stealing his clever but distorting phrase, "faux canon,"
and converting it to my own use. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 27.
377. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd519 U.S. 337 (1997)
378. Id. at 329.
379. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1997).
380. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 57, at 214-15.
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The confusion between heuristics and rules gets so bad that courts often mistakenly
indicate that every pipsqueak canon or maxim is a "rule" which requires the court to
decide the case a certain way. Examples can be found rather easily, but a particularly
inane 1995 case involved the lowly "last antecedent" concept, which is a mildly pre-
sumptive linguistic canon related to placement of words in a sentence. 38' The court,
however, wrote:
Campbell's reading contradicts the well-established canon of construction named the
"doctrine of the last antecedent," which requires that "qualifying words, phrases, and
clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding, and are not
to be construed as extending to or including others more remote."
382
The doctrine of last antecedent requires no such thing. Numerous other opinions
have characterized this tool much more accurately:
This principle [last antecedent] is of no great force: it is only operative when there is
nothing in the statute indicating that the relative words or qualifying provision is in-
tended to have a different effect. And very slight indication of legislative purpose or a
parity of reason, or the natural and common sense reading of the statute, may overturn
it and give it a more comprehensive appcaton.
To say that a court is required to do something by the "rule of last antecedent" is to
demonstrate ignorance of the very precept itself. To say that it is "required" is to per-
petuate the confusion which plagues lawyers and courts, and provides fodder for aca-
demics to complain about incoherent judicial statutory interpretation. Such remarks
show the kind of confusion which can result if we speak, and therefore drift into con-
ceiving, of the tools and concepts of statutory construction as substantive "rules of law."
By itself, of course, this particular judicial error of elevating the "last antecedent"
into the status of a binding substantive rule was minor. Another panel in the circuit
probably will act later as though the words of that case were never written. That's part
381. The "last antecedent" concept is a minor tool related to the location of modifying words or phrases.
Generally, there is a mild presumption that a modifying phrase located after a particular word in a statute
refers only to the word preceding it. A good clarifying (and easy) example is "I would like to have a cat, a dog,
or a cow that jumps over the moon." Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over
Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 712 (2001) (citation omitted). In that sentence, "that jumps over the
moon" is taken as referring to the cow. Unfortunately, statutory language is not always so simple. For a gen-
eral but oversimplified discussion of "last antecedent," see SINGER, supra note 82, § 47:33. There, in some-
what of an understatement, the author refers to the last antecedent concept as "not inflexible." Id.
382. United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1995) (dealing with enhancement of punish-
ment after conviction on charges of transporting women across state lines for immoral purposes) (emphasis
added).
383. Buscaglia v. Bowie 139 F.2d 294, 296 (1st Cir. 1943) (citing and quoting the standard multi-volume
treatise of the time, "Lewis, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, § 420"). As another case said merely in
passing, "[T]he rule of the last antecedent is hardly a mandatory rule of statutory construction." Am. Gen. Fin.,
Inc. v, Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203, 1208 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002).
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of the incoherence of course, but the incoherence here results from an avoidable mis-
take-a mistaken characterization of a concept or tool as being a legal rule.
In any event, the cumulative impact of court after court writing as though these heu-
ristics are rules having the force and effect of law increases the chaos and misconcep-
tions that result from such misstatements. Characterizing these heuristics and tools as
"rules" will not convert them into substantive rules of law. As pointed out above, 384 the
concepts and tools of statutory interpretation often conflict and often are in tension.
They are relative in nature and their force in a given case inevitably depends on context.
Deep down, moreover, we as lawyers know that everything is not a rule, and that
we cannot have a rule for everything. Where we get confused and go wrong in our larger
jurisprudence, of course, is our strong tendency to treat everything in this era of deca-
dent positivism as a "rule." The very reference to something as a "rule," with all of the
semantic baggage that comes with calling something a rule, leads courts and theorists
into misunderstanding the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation, and conse-
quently, misunderstanding statutory interpretation.8 5
Recognizing that the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are heuristics-
rules of thumb-about how we attribute meaning to statutory language could both ex-
plain a lot, and prevent a lot of confusion. Avoiding confusion and achieving greater
clarity are not minor benefits, and certainly not to be scoffed at. 86
They can fashion substantive rules of decision by attributing certain "meanings" to
statutory language in the context of decided cases. They can even say that the heuristics
they use in statutory interpretation are "rules" in the substantive sense, or at least write
opinions as if they were. But the courts cannot change the nature of human mental proc-
esses, including their own. Reading and attributing meaning are human mental processes
which involve inferring "meaning" from marks on a page.38 7 The mental processing of
written language, especially statutory language, ultimately cannot be a matter of "sub-
stantive" rules having the force and effect of law. To pretend that it is a matter of rules
simply is wrong, just as it would be wrong and pig-headed to insist that human inductive
processes could be confined to a set of substantive rules from which no departure was
allowed.
Statutory interpretation would be much less confused and messy if we recognized
the concepts and tools of statutory construction for what they are-heuristics, or at least
heuristic in nature. We would no longer muddle things by trying to treat them as sub-
stantive rules, then wading into the resulting mire of conflicting "rules," and then com-
plaining about the very conflicts, tensions and incoherence which we have created by
insisting that these heuristics are substantive legal rules. To try to treat everything in the
law as a substantive "rule" is to be like the proverbial fellow whose only tool was a
384. See, e.g., supra Part V.B.6.
385. See supra note 362.
386. Cf H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597-600
(1958) (suggesting the value of clarity and dispelling confusion in legal theory).
387. See supra Part I1I.A-G.
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hammer. To him, every problem was a nail.388 If concepts and tools of statutory interpre-
tation are heuristics, and not substantive rules having the force and effect of law, the
conflicts, tensions, and even apparent incoherence are merely a by-product of their being
different concepts and tools, all available to be taken out of our mental toolboxes for
appropriate use.
9. Conclusion: Explanatory Force
The concepts and tools of statutory interpretation, being heuristics, are just different
ways of drawing inferences. There are different mental tools, some relevant in some
situations, some relevant in others, and yes, sometimes in conflict. With or without aca-
demic recognition of their nature, these heuristics continue. We can call the intent heu-
ristic "legislative intent," or we can call it being "holistic," or we can call it "Hermen,"
as in hermeneutic. They are still heuristics, and they can help us explain a great deal
about statutory interpretation.
Recognizing concepts and tools such as "plain meaning" and "intent" for what they
are-heuristics or ways of thinking about how to arrive at (or explain) a decision when
applying written text to a particular case-helps us use all of these tools, and helps ex-
plain why courts developed their use and continue to use them. All work. All have their
legitimate uses. None can be totally ignored or mechanically "privileged" one above the
other.
When we realize that the use of "text" and "intent" are matters of heuristics, then
we have an explanatory framework for, and a different perspective on, statutory inter-
pretation. We may not be able to so easily criticize courts for not having a "theory" of
statutory interpretation, or imply that their lack of an academically satisfying theory is
attributable to judicial messiness, or worse.389 In fact, "grand theories ' 390 in the abstract,
philosophical sense could be disastrous. If courts actually tried to follow some abstract
philosophical theory of statutory interpretation, they might wind up imposing the worst
kind of artificial, mechanical, rule-bound jurisprudence on statutory interpretation.
C. Second Reason: Foundation for Study
A second benefit of realizing that the tools and concepts of statutory interpretation
are heuristics is that this realization provides a foundation for further, and fruitful, de-
velopment. Even if they are not heuristics, a large part of the study of statutory interpre-
tation should be, and always should have been, the study of the tools and concepts of
statutory interpretation.
388. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1991) ("If
the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.")
389. See supra Parts I, II.A-B.
390. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Realizing that the tools and concepts of statutory interpretation are heuristics gives
us a fresh starting point for study. These judicial heuristics, of course, are not necessar-
ily the same "heuristics" which have been studied in cognitive research. But the meth-
odology of people like Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky suggests the value of an analo-
gous approach for us. 391 That approach is to study the heuristics themselves, and their
associated biases, as Tversky, Slovic, Kahneman, and hundreds of their colleagues did,
and continue to do.392
Of course, they have a scientific, experimental methodology, which is not generally
available to us. But an analogous approach is available. We could start working from the
"bottom up," a term which already has surfaced with reference to statutory interpreta-
tion.393 However, for the study of statutory heuristics and their associated biases, the
"bottom up" approach would be the laborious task of studying the various heuristics-
tools and concepts of statutory interpretation-which are used, or could be used, in the
complex process of applying abstract statutory language to live disputes and problems.
This would give us some new-actually old-fashioned-ways to study and think about
statutory interpretation.
Of course, this would be tedious work. Building from the ground up, studying par-
ticular tools and concepts in detail, studying how the courts use them, and developing
sound descriptive insights, is a mundane undertaking. Nor is it particularly fashionable
in some legal academic circles.394 But study is needed in these mundane areas, if we are
to achieve a better understanding of statutory interpretation, of what the courts do, and
of what they say they do. Once we start thinking about the tools and concepts of statu-
tory interpretation as heuristics, all sorts of ideas and questions start coming to mind. To
39 1. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162.
392. See id.; PLOUS, supra note 163; see also infra Parts III, IV (examining works on cognitive psychology
and related fields).
393. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories of Statutory Con-
struction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 410
(1996) (referring to "emerging consensus that courts need to develop interpretive approaches adapted to the
unique features of the statutory scheme being construed ... [and] widespread agreement that the Federal Rules
of Evidence are special statutes," thus requiring courts "to tailor the interpretive strategy for the Federal
Rules.")
The best known example probably is William Eskridge who, albeit in a different context, has used the
term "bottom up" to describe his important insight that "we should stop looking at statutory interpretation just
from the perspective of the Supreme Court and instead consider statutes from the 'bottom up,' from the per-
spective of private parties, agencies, and lower courts, whose work most shapes statutes and influences what
the Court hears and how it will resolve cases." ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra
note 9, at 69 (footnote and citation omitted).
394. For some articles criticizing some tendencies in legal scholarship, see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (criticizing, as
the title suggests, lack of attention to doctrinal study of what courts actually are doing and emphasis on ab-
stract theories); Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Jour-
nals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 871, 871 (1996) (quoting, among others,
Judge Laurence Silberman, who complained that "many of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic
offerings of increasingly out-of-touch faculty members. United States v. Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine Thou-
sand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight Dollars in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman,
J., concurring).
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demonstrate that this article is offering slightly more than a vague "Let's do more study"
finale, a few examples are offered below:
- Each of the standard concepts and tools of statutory interpretation could be the
subject of significant work. For example, there seem to be several heuristics and biases
related to "context." Most obviously, the "whole statute"395 concept seems to be a "con-
text" heuristic. Less obviously, the old in pari materia concept, which is praised by
textualists in its simplistic contemporary form of "considering other statutes, 396 seems
to be a "context" heuristic. To take another heuristic (or pair of heuristics) the concepts
of strict and liberal construction have already been the subject of some recent study,
although not from a "heuristic" perspective.397 There is plenty of room, and need, for
development, refinement, improvement, and academic discussion of the traditional con-
cepts and tools of statutory interpretation.
- How should academics critique the judicial use of heuristics? Because these heu-
ristics are not substantive rules having the force and effect of law, it may be that a dif-
ferent kind of academic criticism and different set of standards should be developed-or
refined. It goes without saying that the standards should NOT selectively approve some
and disapprove others on the basis of some political or ideological agenda.
- Could new heuristic methods be developed, academically, to refine gloppy ones
like "plain meaning"? Is "New Textualism" actually one of those refinements? 398 In
different direction but related vein, one important article has proceeded in the direction
of suggesting generally some new principles of statutory interpretation.399
The idea of statutory interpretation tools as heuristics is relatively simple, yet has a
foundation complex enough-much like chess-that generations of legal scholars could
profitably pursue this line of development. If this is an age of statutes,400 then the judi-
cial application of statutes is a matter of utmost importance, both theoretically and prac-
tically. If an important aspect of legal academia is, as Frankfurter implied, a play of
informed critique on the work of judges,40 ' we must first be accurate about what the
courts are doing.
395. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
396. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 1099 ("Textualists agree that other statutes form a part of the context in
which a court must understand the text of any given statute; Justice Scalia says that the text of a statute must
be interpreted in light of the entire corpus juris." (citations omitted)).
397. See Mullins, supra note 64, at I -12. Although not expressed in terms of heuristics, that article stud-
ied in detail the concepts of strict and liberal construction, and was far from exhausting the subject. As a
matter of hindsight, it would appear that strict and liberal constructions are heuristics, or labels for sets of
heuristics.
398. See supra Part II.B. I.
399. Sunstein, supra note 40, at 476-81, 503-08 (arguing among other things for a new set of background
principles and rejecting some of the traditional tools and concepts).
400. GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES I (1982)
401. See NLRB v. Universal Camera, Inc., 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) ("The ultimate reliance for the fair
operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an informed
professional critique upon its work.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, in order to think clearly, we must recognize complexity and admit our
human limitations. By its nature, statutory interpretation is a complex exercise of the
human mind that cannot be conducted rigidly, nor can judicial discretion about drawing
inferences from statutory language be confined mechanically. Not everything in our
legal system is a substantive "rule" having the force and effect of law. By understanding
the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation as heuristics, and understanding those
heuristics, we may find some coherence in a facially chaotic area of the law, and expla-
nations for some of the phenomena of statutory interpretation.
If this article is correct, courts will continue to use the traditional tools and con-
cepts, because they reflect how our minds, informed and reinforced by collective experi-
ence, work. The statutory heuristics, and their associated biases and risks of error, are
more basic and enduring than any particular academic "theory."
Understanding that the concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are heuristics
gives us a solid foundation on which to study our subject and perhaps, ultimately, build
some grand theories. But theories, grand or otherwise, should proceed from an under-
standing of our subject not wishful thinking or ideological agendas. Theories which are
not based on reality ultimately lead nowhere.
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